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GLOSSARY 
DCT - Discrete Cosine Transform. A transform which presents only the real component of an 
FFT (Fast Fourier Transform). 
JPEG - Joint Photographic Experts Group. An image standard that utilizes the DCT transform 
and a quantizer to achieve image compression. 
LSB - Least Significant Bit. Bit zero, the bit of a binary number giving the number of ones, 
the last or rightmost bit when the number is written in the usual way. In steganography, 
this refers to a method of image embedding that removes the least significant bits from 
the cover image, and injects covert information in its place. Traditionally, 3- and 4-
LSB models have enjoyed widespread use and popularity, meaning that for every (8-
bit) pixel, up to 3/8 or Y2 of the information given at that point may in fact belong to the 
covert data. 
PIRANHA - Acronym. Short for Picture Recognizer And INjection Hardware Appliance. A 
system which will house lightweight components evolved from those within this thesis 
as its engine, and will work with the methodology of analysis presented here to build an 
emergent picture classification system. 
Stego-Image -An image file which contains steganographically embedded data. Also called a 
"cover image" or "cover carrier". 
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ABSTRACT 
In current cutting-edge steganalysis research, model-building and machine learning has 
been utilized to detect steganography. However, these models are computationally and 
cognitively cumbersome, and are specifically and exactly targeted to attack one and only one 
type of steganography. The model built and utilized in this thesis has shown capability in 
detecting a class or family of steganography, while also demonstrating that it is viable to 
construct a minimalist model for steganalysis. The notion of detecting steganographic 
primitives or families is one that has not been discussed in literature, and would serve well as a 
"first-pass" steganographic detection methodology. The model built here serves this end well, 
and it must be kept in mind that the model presented is posited to work as a front-end broad-
pass filter for some of the more computationally advanced and directed stganalytic algorithms 
currently in use. 
This thesis attempts to convey a view of steganography and steganalysis in a manner 
more utilitarian and immediately useful to everyday scenarios. This is vastly different from a 
good many publications that treat the topic as one relegated only to cloak-and-dagger 
information passing. The subsequent view of steganography as primarily a communications 
tool useable by petty information brokers and the like directs the text and helps ensure that the 
notion of steganography as a "digital dead-drop box" is abandoned in favor of a more grounded 
approach. As such, the model presented underperf orms specialized models that have been 
presented in current literature, but also makes use of a large image sample space (747 images) 
as well as images that are contextually diverse and representative of those seen in wide use. 
vm 
In future applications by either law-enforcement or corporate officials, it is hoped that 
the model presented in this thesis can aid in rapid and targeted responses without causing 
undue strain upon an eventual human operator. As such, a design constraint that was utilized 
for this research favored a False Negative as opposed to a False Positive - this methodology 
helps to ensure that, in the event of an alert, it is worthwhile to apply a more directed attack 
against the flagged image. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
With the widespread adoption of the Internet as a public and private communication 
intermediary, message privacy has fallen under increasing scrutiny over the past decade. The 
inherent power of the Internet with respect to communication is also its downfall - as the 
Internet is a network that is both public and ubiquitously accessible from many network edges, 
communications within the network are inherently open to inspection by third parties. This 
concept was born out of Gus Simmons' thought-experiment of 1983 (Simmons, 1984), which 
pitted two prisoners (Alice and Bob) the task of sending messages past an observer -
appropriately referred to as a Warden. The goal was for Alice and Bob to communicate in a 
manner that would not arouse the suspicion of the Warden, through the concept of a covert 
channel. As the modem Internet has grown out of a fully open and public infrastructure (first 
ARPANET, then a blended FIDONet/NSFNet architecture), this analogue holds today - Alice 
and Bob may represent any two private parties, and the Warden that looks over their shoulders 
has now expanded to include every node that is within a collision domain residing along the 
public channel between Alice and Bob. This clearly puts private communications at a 
disadvantage, but as personal computing power has increased, so too has the corresponding 
complexity of the encryption options open to private individuals using the Internet to pass 
messages. While it may potentially be argued that both current implemented and widely-used 
encryption standards (DES, 3DES), and largely under-utilized encryption methods (AES) more 
than outstrip present-day machinery and demands, encryption itself does not solve all problems 
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involved within in-group communication across a public network infrastructure as the Internet. 
Encryption, at its core, attempts to mask a message by passing the plaintext through a one-way 
function, such that it is intractably difficult to "decode" the resulting ciphertext via the same 
mechanism that was used in encryption (Bishop, 2003). This naturally infers, then, that the 
security of such a system does not reside within the secrecy of the algorithm used (although a 
notable exception comes with the Black Box notion within the DES algorithm). However, 
with the ability to build affordable, scalable clusters and grids using off-the-shelf commercial 
technology that has come about in the past ten years, and the implementation of quantum 
computing perpetually 'just around the corner", encryption algorithms that have historically 
been considered intractably difficult have now become attackable by commonplace hardware. 
One mechanism that marks the defeat of an encryption algorithm is the ability to create a 
collision, such as was found in both MD51 (Rivest, 1992) and SHA-12 (N. S. Agency, 1995) 
security algorithms recently. Even with the assumption that the future will bring about the 
creation of new and more robust encryption algorithms, the fundamental problem present 
within the dependence upon encryption as a mechanism to secure communications still exists -
the issue is one of participant discovery. For instance, if group G is set up such that G{a,b ... z} 
(where a,b ... z are members of group G), if a sends a message to b, who then relays the 
message on to members c, d, and e, then it is very possible for a Warden to achieve, given 
enough traffic, full disclosure of the membership of G. With the technological advances 
1 CertainKey will award its $10,000 bounty (Inc., 2004) to a trio of Chinese researchers [the same group that is 
mentioned in the footnote below for compromising SHA-1] for the feat. MD5 was broken in February of 2004. 
2 This is just starting to unfold as of February 18, 2005 - the short of it is that a trio of Chinese researchers 
[Xuejia Lai, Xaioyun Wang, and Hongbo Yu of the Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering at Shanghai 
Jiaotong University in Shanghai, China] devised a collision attack for SHA-1 that is about 2000 times faster 
than a brute force attack; see Bruce Schneier's public web log (Schneier, 2005) for more details. 
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discussed above, and the ubiquity of powerful computers, the desire for Agents within G to be 
able to secretly send covert messages to each other is increasingly more poignant. 
Traditional one-to-one communications between Agents within group G have given 
way to one-to-many and even many-to-many communiques in recent years with the 
proliferation of network-attached edges of the Internet, and the corresponding lowering of the 
"cost of admission" to Internet participation - in both monetary cost as well as through pre-
built network applications. Electronic mail has experienced a decline in usefulness for 
message dissemination, both logistically as free and open email proxies have diminished and 
also through the growing popularity and use of larger-scale communications such as web 
logging ("blogging") and message boards. These two solutions both avoid exposing endpoints 
of the communication and also enable many-to-many communications to take place with 
relative ease. As such, the communication is able to take place through a virtual "cloud" rather 
than a one-to-one pipeline between participants, and therefore becomes much more difficult to 
uncover. With this foundation in place, it becomes apparent that the next generation of data 
encryption and security will not only rely upon more complex ciphers, but must also make use 
of the currently underutilized concept of masking the message within an innocuous carrier. 
This masking of the target with spurious or innocuous information has the end result of making 
the separation of signal from noise increasingly more difficult and devastatingly more time-
consuming from the perspective of a Warden operating within the network. 
The next battlefield of information security clearly must be focused on the issue of 
determining the scope of information dissemination. As has been mentioned earlier, it is 
convenient to believe that any encryption algorithm is at risk of exposure. Therefore, given 
enough computing power and/or message samples, algorithms may be reverse-engineered 
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through the use of data collisions and statistical measures. Putting this aside, even fiendishly 
and impossibly difficult algorithms applied to traditional communications will still uncover 
involved parties in the communication. Therefore, the next generation of communication 
across public channels (such as the Internet) must meet two disparate ends: the communication 
must be ultimately and widely accessible while remaining secure and covert. There exists a 
largely under-utilized methodology of presentation that meets these ends - steganography. 
Steganography holds that data may be inserted into an innocuous carrier stream - for the 
purposes here in this paper, this carrier is an image produced in coordination with the JPEG file 
specification - and transforms results in the creation of a stego-image, an image 
indistinguishable from the original image upon casual inspection by a third party. The net 
result of this transformation fits perfectly into current covert communication requirements as 
the data becomes both hidden in "noise" and also may be encrypted via any method available 
to the parties involved in the communication3, thus protecting the message from direct 
inspection should its presence be uncovered. 
Even through terms such as "covert message", "covert channel", and "prisoners' 
dilemma" all sound quite cloak-and-dagger, there exist a good many scenarios in which 
disclosure of membership within a communicating group is far from the back-rooms of three-
letter governmental agencies. For instance, hoboes' writing of the 1930s has recently 
reappeared in the form of "warchalking", which makes use of cryptic symbology to convey 
information regarding wireless access points covertly (Thomas, 2004). A more business-
oriented example might be found in a transaction where it is potentially as or even more 
3 As steganography makes no underlying assumptions to the format of the source, it is be possible to utilize any 
and all cryptographic methods in sending a stego-image - for instance, pairing stego-imagery with PKI will 
result in a message that is covert, secure, and can verify the sender through use of message signing. 
5 
important to protect the members of the discussion than the discussion itself - details of a 
merger taking place between two companies, discussed by their respective principals, would 
certainly present a non cloak-and-dagger and above-the-board use for steganography. 
However, it is important to note that this particular application is given here only as a 
counterpoint to present steganography in a typically neglected light - this thesis treats 
subsequent mentions of steganography and steganographic embedding as a form of 
communication that is unwanted on the network, dangerous, and potentially illicit. 
Granted, in the face of the above notion that not all use for covert communications is 
cloak-and-dagger, it provides an obvious advantage for a group to remain undetected for as 
long as possible when communicating messages in the presence of a Warden. As such, and as 
groups become more globally diverse and far-flung, ascertaining group membership and 
building social network maps of these groups is becoming more imminently important than 
necessarily discovering just what the agents within the groups are saying to each other. A good 
deal of research in communications security has been spent in conducting an "arms race" of 
sorts through building increasingly more mathematically intractable one-way functions for 
encryption. Conversely, faster cryptographic algorithms with which to defeat these have also 
been built; thus, it is more productive to instead gain an insight into which messages contain 
spurious information for the purpose of finding the involved parties of the communication. 
However, even with the notion that steganographic communication is not only to be relegated 
to cloak-and-dagger operations, it is typically a good mental shortcut to extend research in this 
field to include complete utilization by governments and subversives alike. In doing so, the 
trap of seeing steganography only in the light of what Bruce Schneier might dub a system to 
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"fool your kid sister" is avoided, as steganography is most assuredly the other kind (Schneier, 
1996) of secret communication methodology. 
Given the importance and urgency of the above paragraph with respect to global affairs, 
this thesis will introduce a machine-learning engine - utilizing an Artificial Neural Network -
that will potentially aid in the discovery of covert communication endpoints by determining if a 
presented image is suspect, which will imply that the image is a probable stego-image, or if the 
image is instead benign, meaning that the image appears to not be a covert channel for 
information. 
1.2. Purpose and Significance of the Research 
Steganalysis, as Chandramouli et al. note, has two primary approaches: one may build 
a steganalytical attack against one known steganographic technique, or one may build an attack 
that is able to detect the existence of steganography, but will be inherently unable to determine 
which steganographic method is employed (Chandramouli, Kharrazi, & Memon, 2003). This 
thesis, however, takes a blended approach as of yet unseen in the research stream. This is an 
important "next step" for the steganalysis to take, as new steganographic techniques are being 
developed continuously, and it is simply not granular enough to give an examiner a simple 
"yes" or "no" answer to the question "is steganography present within this image?". Rather, 
an examiner must be able to look at an analysis which will be able to present a confidence 
rating from several different styles of steganographic embedding in addition to a unified model. 
In this fashion, current techniques will be captured (e.g. "this new data conforms well with an 
LSB-insertion analysis") as well as future steganographic techniques. 
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Unlike some other steganographic and image techniques that are aided through use of a 
difference image (for an example, see (Mendoza, 1999)), the method presented in this thesis for 
steganalysis make no assumption about the existence of a difference image, thus enabling the 
engine to view entirely new images and determine if the image is suspect or not. Indeed, since 
recent literature regarding steganography makes both explicit (Lou & Liu, submitted) as well 
as implicit (Lou & Liu, 2002) mention of the "Common Cover Carrier Attack", in which 
acquisition of a difference image (e.g. a common cover image that carries the embedded covert 
information) trivializes detection of covert information, this thesis will take the position that no 
such Common Cover Carrier Attack may be carried out - in other words, the method presented 
in this thesis has zero a-priori knowledge with respect to the content of the images as they are 
processed. Section 2.2.3.3 carries a discussion on the weakness of steganographic and 
watermarking techniques when difference images are utilized as expressed by Petitcolas et al. 
(Petitcolas, Anderson, & Kuhn, 1998). 
It is vital to come back to a point that has, thus far, been largely implied: the type of 
model-building present in this thesis has two primary goals. The first, of course, is to predict 
and classify images as either "stego-imagery" or "benign". A sub-goal of this, as development 
of the PIRANHA engine will continue to grow beyond the scope of this thesis, is to err on the 
side of missing true positives, while instead focusing upon providing a good probability of a 
reported positive being an actual positive. In short, the penalty for mis-classifying a benign 
image as a stego-image is higher than missing a stego-image by calling it benign. This is an 
important research consideration to make note of. The second main goal, which is unique to 
this thesis, is to find a minimal model that will yield adequate classification results. This is a 
worthwhile venture, as the PIRANHA engine attempts to provide for a much more useable and 
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"real-world" model than is seen in publication. For instance, in the example about information 
brokering and leakage by a company insider through steganography, it is reasonable to assume 
that the insider will not build a highly complex second-order model of the image file and then 
dynamically insert the covert information within it accordingly; rather, it is probable that they 
will either use a pre-packaged tool (such as Steghide), or write a quick program to achieve 
static n-LSB insertions as is discussed in Kurak (Kurak & McHugh, 1992). 
The above is viable, interesting, and significant in its simplicity and targeted nature - in 
effect, many individuals using steganography to embed information are likely not going to be 
image-processing experts. Hence, a model which will be maximally effective will do two 
things: it will look at a gargantuan body of images and be able to do so in a reasonable time, 
and will strive to reduce the workload on an individual operator wanting to work to extract data 
or further analyze the reported stego-image. A model that tries to minimize computational 
time and cognitive and computational complexity is parsimonious with these approaches in its 
simplicity of operation - and, given enough individual modules making decisions, it is possible 
to create an engine that may well outperform any single monolithic engine through its 
emergent properties. 
1.3. Scope of Work 
This thesis is concerned with the following primary goal: the creation of an engine that 
will detect both current and future forms of technical steganography. This thesis looks at 
steganography in one and only one context with regard to analysis: the embedding of covert 
information in JPEG image files. This kind of a bounding condition is necessary, given the 
plethora of steganographic carrier media (refer to Section 2.2, below, for a detailed overview 
and analysis) in current use. In designing the PIRANHA engine, however, great pains were 
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taken to avoid a special-purpose system that could only be used for this purpose. There is, 
therefore, no reason why the method presented in Section 3 could not be expanded to detect 
messages within other kinds of carrier media (e.g. BMP files, which embed covert bits 
physically in the spatial-domain of the cover image; GIF files, which make use of palette 
shuffling techniques [common computer programs to achieve this include EzStego (Machado, 
1996), Gifshuffle (Kwan, 2003), and Hide and Seek (Moroney, 1996)] to embed 1675 
[log2(256!)] bits (Kwan, 2003) of covert data into the file). There is also no reason why the 
method presented cannot, by extension, also detect different methods of steganography in 
either JPEG carriers or other media. 
As the thesis progresses, it is important to take note that, given the content, topics 
covered will naturally include a defense of the investigative methodology utilized (Artificial 
Neural Networks), as well as either butting against or encroaching upon topics within 
watermarking and document distribution and cryptography. This takes place intentionally, and 
is a necessary part of providing full coverage into steganography. Figure 1.1, adapted from 
Bauer (Bauer, 1997), provides an overview of where steganography fits into the more global 
picture of information embedding as well as the inclusion of watermarking as a specific type of 
steganography. 
As the suggested communication strategy makes use of steganography over widely 
used public channels, the classification engine concerns tries to accomplish the following 
goals: 
• Repeatable and reliable classification of an image as either suspect or benign, 
• Output of image analysis in a common format, such as a comma-separated file. 
• Compatibility and interoperability with commercially available software. 
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Cryptography 
(secret writing) 
I 
Stegano graphy Cryptography proper (covert secret 
writing) (overt secret writing) 
I 
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Watennarking Watermarking writing) writing) 
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I l l 
Figure 1.1 - Steganography in situ with other information hiding schemes (adapted from (Bauer, 1997)) 
1.4. Plan of presentation 
Chapter 2 will present the literature review for steganography. Additionally, the "arms 
race" that has been touched upon in the introduction between steganography and steganalysis 
will be expanded and analyzed. 
Chapter 3 will present the research methodology, and cover topics endemic to the 
research problem. Such topics include discussions regarding the JPEG file standard, image 
processing, equipment used in the research, data preparation and warehousing, and model 
building. 
11 
Chapter 4 will cover results achieved using the methodology described in chapter 3. 
Moreover, this chapter will also provide a feedback loop for the equipment used and methods 
developed in chapter 3. 
Chapter 5 will engage the reader in a discussion of the research, and present a 
discussion of the findings from chapter 4. Furthermore, chapter 5 will look at the limitations of 
the current study and make suggestions on the improvement and extension of the PIRANHA 
engine. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
The art of steganography - literally "covered writing" - has likely existed in one form 
or another for as long as humans have been inclined to keep written secrets. A well-known 
anecdote from Herodotus includes Histi<eus shaving the head of a trusted slave and tattooing a 
message upon the scalp (Herodotus). The hair was then allowed to regrow, at which time the 
slave made the journey to the message recipient. Were the slave-cum-messenger to be 
detained en route, the secret was typically kept safe under the cover of the man's hair. Indeed, 
this low-tech approach to steganography was still in use by spies in the early portion of the 201h 
century (B. Newman, 1940). However, for the purposes of this thesis, Gaspar Schott's 1680 
work, Schola Steganographica (Schott, 1680), will suffice as marking the first point at which 
discourse at length was formally undertaken and published involving steganography4. While I 
was unable to acquire a copy of the work for review, its inclusion here marks an important 
realization: steganography is by no means a new - or even young - discipline, and has enjoyed 
centuries of use and protection. 
What is changing significantly in our present epoch, however, is the art of steganalysis. 
Steganalysis may be thought of with regard to steganography as decryption is to encryption: it 
provides a means of discovering the presence of steganography. However, it must be noted 
that the same mathematical and technological advances that are furthering steganalysis are also 
4 Trithemius' earlier work, Steganographia (Trithemius, 1621), is not considered in this thesis because it 
presents steganography simply and principally only as a vehicle for the preservation of occult writing and 
teaching. Even though Schott's work extended on this initial treatise, it is less focused upon the occult and 
more upon the examination of information embedding, as is seen in its encoding of an alphabet within the notes 
of Ava Maria. 
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means to more effectively and efficiently hide the message in "noise'', and the techniques 
present on both sides of the problem are gaining momentum. As will unfold below, this 
environment leads to a sort of "arms race" between two factions: researchers creating more 
effective algorithms for data embedding, and those unraveling the work of their peers, and 
striving to expose innocuous-appearing carrier signals as instead a wrapper around a secret 
message. 
2.2. Steganography & Steganalysis 
Steganography, as has been mentioned above, occurs when any signal purposefully 
inhabits cover noise to mask its presence. It naturally follows from this that there can be many 
instantiations of steganography - indeed, there may be as many instantiations of steganography 
as there are types of carriers. This thesis will be constrained to the discovery of steganographic 
embedding within computer image files - namely, JPEG images - but, for completeness, will 
provide a high-level coverage of alternate carriers of steganographically embedded 
information. The next few sections will cover literature pertinent to exploring steganography 
first in the absence of computer images completely, and then in the absence of properties 
unique to JPEG images, and then finally steganography involving feature extraction with 
features unique to JPEG files. After these steganographic methods have been examined, this 
thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of the "arms race" that has earmarked the development 
of progressively ever more intricate and intractably difficult practice of steganography. 
2.2.1. Steganographic Encoding, Pre-Scho/a Steganographia Years 
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Earlier, it was mentioned that the "birth" of measured discourse upon steganography 
came at the hands of Schott. However, the realization must be made that this is not to say that 
other methods did not come before Schola Steganographia. From Herodotus' description of 
Demeratus' clever ruse involving a "clean" wax tablet to warn Sparta of the Persian invasion to 
.tEneas the Tactician's writing of messages hidden on the soles of the messengers' feet 
(Tacticus, 1990), it is clear that Schott is not the pioneer of steganography, but rather compiled 
most of his tome from information available in 1680. Both linguistic and artistic 
steganography (an offshoot mentioned in this section alone) existed before Schott's work, with 
a predominance placed upon the former form of steganography. As the concept is seldom 
solidified, a quick word is needed to provide an exemplar for the concept of artistic 
steganography. 
Artistic steganography is a form of covert communication via traditional artistry -
painting is the easiest medium to imagine. Sho's work the Vexierbild typifies artistic 
steganography, in that extreme-angle imagery was used within the painting, such that the 
content shifted between that of an abstract landscape to portraits of kings if viewed from the 
correct vantage point. 
Linguistic steganography, by comparison, works to "codify" a hidden message in an 
innocuous cover text. Typically, this end has been met through use of either the traditional 
embedding a "pattern" of letter use within the text itself (e.g. "every third letter of every word 
contains the covert message"), or the spacing of either inter-character or intra-line layout with 
the advent and wide use of automated publishing tools such as the printing press. Giovanni 
Boccaccio's Amorosa visione and the Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (Anonymous, 1499) serve as 
basic examples of linguistic steganography; Hypnerotomachia Poliphili contains a pointed 
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message that was physically spelled out in the first letter of the 38 chapters5• Francis Bacon, in 
book N of his 1623 Latin edition of "Advancement of Learning" (Bacon, 1623), divulges a 
cipher that he claims to have invented - the Biliteral Cipher6• Additionally, the actual 
embedding process into cover text takes place by making very slight alterations in the physical 
structure of the marked letters themselves. This slight alteration was then used to reproduce a 
"key" wherein five characters 7 were utilized to compose one single decrypted letter. This 
principle of letter-by-letter encoding and decoding through grouping binary digits (bits) 
together later went on to be used and standardized most notably by Samuel F. B. Morse in 
1844, and then Emile Baudot in 1875 (through use of a five-bit system) for the transmission of 
messages. Morse code, by its design, did not lend itself well to automation; Baudot code 
(Tampa Bay Interactive, 1998a) went on to enjoy further success as a representation and 
communication strategy in automation and machinery, culminating in its use in the 
teletypewriter (Tampa Bay Interactive, 1998b ). The embedding methods covered thus far have 
been periodic and cyclical in nature, meaning that once a single instance of linguistic 
steganography has been discovered, the pattern itself may be played out over the entire body of 
the text to divulge more of the original message text, leading to a complete recovery of the 
previously hidden message. However, even prior to Schola Steganographia, rudimentary 
groundwork had already been laid to overcome this - ancient China used a method of 
"masking" a blank sheet of paper with a template with holes placed at random intervals along 
5 Brother Francesco Colonna passionately loves Polia is the message. 
6 Incidentally, it is through finding evidence of the Biliteral Cipher in the works of Shakespeare that some 
scholars have reached the conclusion that perhaps Bacon held the pen behind the works. A discussion on this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but is an interesting segue nonetheless. 
7 Each plaintext character was comprised of five "cover" characters, made up of a sequence of either a orb 
characters. In short, this utilized a binary system that ranged from aaaaa to represent "A" to babbb for "Z". It 
is, then, identical to the Baudot code but for the fact that Bacon's Biliteral Cipher sequentially incremented both 
cipher- and plain-text representations: OOOOO=aaaaa="A'', and OOOOl=aaaab="B". Baudot code, while still 
made up of 5 bits, is non-sequential. 
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its body. The covert message would be written into these spaces, and with the mask removed 
and cover text added, the message was secure to all but the recipient, who had a copy of the 
"key"8. This method of covert communication was later formalized by the Italian 
mathematician Cardan in the early 16th century, resulting in what came to be called the "Cardan 
Grille" method. However, early steganography had the same earmark: individuals involved in 
the message had either key management (in the punched-template example) or the security of a 
covert channel (in the altered-type examples given) to contend with. It will be shown that later, 
this basic choice and weakness was removed, and replaced by intractably difficult methods of 
steganography. 
2.2.2. Linguistic Steganography after Schola Steganographia 
Recall from previous discussion that linguistic steganography hides a covert message 
within a larger text carrier. After Schott' s Schola Steganographia, steganography took a 
decidedly more clandestine tum in linguistic steganography by altering line spacing rather than 
individual characters. This made the discovery of a hidden message much more difficult than 
using marked letters - for instance, even if the marked letters were used in a highly complex 
encoding scheme, the mere presence of such letters making themselves known would eliminate 
the key concept of steganography, and would reduce the problem to a rote cryptography 
exercise. Current-day systems make use of both line-shifting and word- or character-shifting 
techniques9, and operate within extremely tight tolerances; to do this, they must establish a 
8 It is interesting to note that some modern cipher systems (DES, 3DES) represent the same notion here - that of 
a shared symmetric key held by all who wish to join in the conversation. In fact, many of the problems that 
must have plagued ancient Chinese and Italian participants are still faced today, with key management and key 
security at the forefront. 
9 While a variety of these systems make use of line- and character-shifting for document marking purposes, 
these same techniques lend themselves to the encoding of information rather well. 
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protocol of sorts that governs the document's appearance and layout. For instance, if a line is 
to be shifted up (binary 1) or down (binary 0), it must come between two un-shifted lines. This 
works to ensure a "control" scenario in which nuances of document imaging and copying may 
be accounted for. The actual line of text is shifted only 1/150 of an inch (Low, Maxemchuk, 
Brassil, & O'Gorman, 1995), which is impervious to typical visual inspection. This method 
chooses 1/150 of an inch to ensure robustness; an article by the same authors (Brassil, Low, 
Maxemchuk, & O'Gorman, 1995) demonstrates that 1/300 of an inch is a largely viable and 
wholly undetectable measure. The line- or word-shifting method of linguistic steganography is 
successful against the human visual system because 1/300 of an inch is a resolution much finer 
than a human observer may perceive. However, the use of a computer has rendered this 
approach unsuitable for the transmission of highly sensitive messages. As is suggested in 
Electronic Marking and Identification Techniques to Discourage Document Copying (Brassil 
et al., 1995), all a user has to do to detect the presence of such marking within a document can 
be as trivial as magnifying the image and physically counting pixels between lines, or as 
complex as invoking a pattern recognition tool such as the "horizontal projection profile", 
which will detect any shifted lines of text. Additionally, computer algorithms such as centroid 
detection may be invoked (Low et al., 1995) to detect both line and word shifting. As such, 
systems that make use of line- and word-shifting have been largely relegated to the domain of 
content distribution discovery rather than enjoying further use as a means by which embedded 
information may be conveyed. Other linguistic steganography systems, too, have been handily 
defeated through use of computer algorithms - a clear example comes in David Kahn's The 
Codebreakers (Kahn, 1967), in which a message was sent from a German Spy in World War 
IL The cover message reads innocently enough: 
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Apparently neutral's protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman hard hit. Blockade 
issue affects pretext for embargo on by products, ejecting suets and vegetable oils. 
This message, though, acts as a cover for the covert message of "Pershing sails from NY June 
1" when a viewer takes only the second letter of each word to form the message. This 
approach, as it is programmatically easy to implement and iterative, is trivial to defeat. A more 
robust (and modem) example comes from Maher's Texto program (Maher, 1997), which takes 
plaintext and embeds it into a cover comprised of nonsensical pseudo-poetry. While this is 
indeed cryptic, it suffers greatly from even subtle alteration attacks (e.g. such as may be 
experienced with an Active Warden), as long as the attacks are launched "appropriately". 
Additionally, Texto creates poetry which is, by the author's own admission, "really repetitive" 
(emphasis his; from the README file within the Texto package), as well as creating cover text 
that is 10 times larger than the original text. A non-invasive method of surreptitious data 
insertion within a text document cover comes from Matthew Kwan's Snow, which hides 
information at the end of each line through the addition of between 0 and 7 spaces, thus 
enabling 3 bits per line to be hidden (Kwan, 1998). Clearly, this kind of embedding 
mechanism is unsuited today's environment, which typically necessitates a higher-capacity 
storage scheme. On this note, then, begins the fall of linguistic steganography and 
corresponding meteoric rise of the second principal type of steganography - technical 
steganography. 
2.2.3. Technical Steganography 
Technical steganography is distinguished from linguistic steganography through the 
utilization of a non-text carrier, and through the use of specialized tools or toolkits. Figure 1.1, 
from Section 1.3, highlights technical steganography's "fit" into a broader classification of 
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methods that serve to covertly embed information within an overt carrier signal. Two broad 
breakdowns that will be provided here include use of microdot technology, and image injection 
techniques from static 4-LSB insertion methods to fully dynamic systems that scale with the 
image itself. 
2.2.3.1. Microdots 
Microdots are printed messages that make use of their minute size to conceal message 
contents (Kahn, 1967). Many sources inappropriately credit "the famous Professor Zapp, [with 
inventing] the micro-dot process, at the Technical High School in Dresden" (Hoover, 1946) -
indeed, the proceeding quote comes from a Reader's Digest article released by J. Edgar Hoover 
of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. While Walter Zapp, a Latvian engineer, created 
the Minox camera (C. I. Agency), he did not create the process of microdot creation itself. 
Instead, this honor correctly belongs to Emanuel Goldberg, who handed out images, each 
dubbed a Mikrat nach Goldberg - a "Goldberg-style microdot" - with a resolution exceeding 1 
micron at the Sixth International Congress of Photography in Paris in 1925 (Buckland, 2002). 
Essentially, microdots represent an extreme level of image reduction onto film, which typically 
(during and after World War II) was then affixed under postage stamps or onto individual 
characters (such as a period - "."(Hoover, 1946)) of correspondence. Microdots are typically 
viewed as either an "old" technology, as in the case of classic World War II tales, or as an anti-
counterfeiting measure; yet the simple microdot is enjoying a comeback. In fact, U.S. patent 
6,312,911 was awarded for a recent development of using DNA-based microdots message 
embedding purposes (Clelland, Risca, & Bancroft, 1999)10. Additionally, in early August of 
10 More recent advances have come with the realization that this same technology can be used for 
watermarking, which is a specialized kind of steganography, as well as authentication (Chartrand, 2002). 
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2004, Wired carried an article (Leahy, 2004) in which microdots are revealed to be used in 
automobile applications as a form of part tagging, which makes prosecution of reselling stolen 
car parts a successful prospect. Clearly, microdots have their purpose as covert carriers of 
information, but their use for intelligence-gathering or covert message passing has largely 
fallen out of common use with the decline of postal communications and corresponding rise of 
electronic communications. 
2.2.3.2. JPEG Images as a Steganographic Cover 
In any digital image representation format, there exists some "slack" amount of space, 
which may be utilized for hiding information without noticeably degrading the image itself. 
Different steganography tools will provide different embedding capabilities with respect to 
both utilization and evasion of detection. In his 1991 article (Wallace, 1991), Gregory Wallace 
presents the JPEG file format as a potential standard in digital image compression for 
continuous-tone grayscale and color images. An important note to keep in mind, as more on 
the file specification and steganographic embedding techniques are discussed, is that JPEG, 
through quantization, is a lossy compression 11 routine. It is so by virtue that quantization itself 
is a many-to-one mapping. The JPEG file specification utilizes a block-based encoding 
scheme, which partitions the source image into a series of 8x8 pixel blocks, and encodes these 
blocks through use of a DCT algorithm (sometimes referred to as the FDCT, or Forward-DCT, 
algorithm). For lossy images, the 64 (8x8) DCT coefficients are next passed through a 
quantizer, which discards information that is not visually significant. Finally, the blocks are 
passed through a Huffman or other such entropy encoder, which is able to provide lossless 
11 The JPEG Still Picture Compression Standard (Wallace, 1991), however, does allow for JPEGs to utilize 
lossless encoding. Typical JPEG files, though, are so encoded specifically due to the desirability of smaller 
file sizes while maintaining a modicum of image fidelity. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, all JPEG 
files will be assumed to be compressed using the lossy encoding algorithm laid out. 
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compression by encoding the DCT coefficients based upon their statistical characteristics. 
Please refer to Figure 2.1 for a graphical overview of this process. The JPEG file format 
marked an important development for computing and message embedding alike, given its 
tractability of computation (every visual element is governed by membership in an 8x8 
aggregated block that is reasonable in its processing time), and also its multiple representation 
of visual elements. Considering that the quantization process takes an approximation from its 
source to present a single visual element, the realization may be made that, just as a will lead to 
picture element p, so may b or cord also give rise top. As such, it is possible to manipulate 
the file such that visually the image appears uncorrupted, but this is not the case "behind the 
scenes". Insight into this process will be given later in Section 3.2.2. 
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Figure 2.1 - DCT-Based Encoder (top) and Decoder (bottom) (Wallace, 1991) 
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We have thus far seen how the JPEG file specification accomplishes encoding, but 
what happens when a viewer wishes to decode the image data for presentation? Simply stated, 
decoding is just the reverse of encoding - but the realization must be made that there is room 
for error (or, in our case, data injection) in the DCT table without image degradation or 
corruption. Exactly how will be explained later, in Section 3.2.2. 
From the discussion above, it becomes an important point to realize that JPEG files 
have in fact two representations of data for each element - as with transforms of DCT's ilk12 -
the "spatial domain" and the "frequency domain". As such, JPEG images have two domains in 
which data may be covertly embedded - a fact that has not gone unnoticed by either 
steganography or steganalysis researchers. 
2.2.3.3. 4- and 3-LSB Static Encoding in JPEG Images 
Kurak and McHugh's seminal work (Kurak & McHugh, 1992) on Least-Significant Bit 
steganography focuses on hiding one image within a cover image through use of 4-LSB 
encoding. This means that for every 8-bit pixel in their 256x256 pixel image dataset, the least 
significant 4 bits (rightmost) of every pixel in the cover image is replace with information from 
the image that is being hidden. While the approach may seem immediately detectable, the 
reality of the situation was that, given the images utilized were 8-bit (256 levels) gray-scale in 
format, it is difficult for both display device and the human eye to differentiate between one 
level of gray and the next. Indeed, "about 100 levels is all that [the human eye] can distinguish 
under ideal circumstances" (Kurak & McHugh, 1992). The authors further go on to explain 
that, given rough surfaces presented in the image, 4-LSB insertion methods may escape 
12 Rightly so, as the Discrete Cosine Transform (OCT) is actually a cut-down version (only the real component) 
of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) (Marshall, 2001 ). 
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detection, but that smooth (or "flat", as they deem them) surfaces may survive visual detection 
even if the 3 least significant bits are being used to carry a hidden data stream (3-LSB 
insertion). The methodology utilized here was a serial 4-LSB embedding of each pixel in the 
secret image into the cover image, with no regard for visual degradation or randomization. If, 
for instance, one were to become aware of the presence of an embedded secret message, then it 
would be quite possible to write a program that would capture the last 4 bits of each pixel, and 
thusly reconstruct the original secret image. Therein, though, lies the rub: Kurak and McHugh 
set the upcoming stage by stating that "[ d]etection of hidden images is expected to be a hard 
problem" (Kurak & McHugh, 1992). 
In response to this, Attacks on Copyright Marking Systems (Petitcolas et al., 1998) 
dismisses this kind of bit-plane replacement signal as "easy to detect". However, it must be 
kept in mind that the key item that distinguishes Petitcolas et al's paper from the kind of pure 
steganography that this thesis is examining is the realization that, in dealing with a copyright 
(e.g. watermark) embedding system, an original image exists in the world - in this case, 
digitally. Hence, it is indeed trivial to take a difference image histogram, which "overlays" the 
two images and makes a pixel-by-pixel comparison (by subtracting Pixelimagel from Pixelimage2) 
between the two, and come to one of four overall conclusions residing within two cases. It 
may well be that the difference image is comprised wholly of zero values, meaning that the two 
images completely match at every pixel. This would result in a completely black image, 
meaning that either (1) both images are genuine or (2) both images are exact copies of a 
falsified image (or, for our purposes here, both are stego-images acting as a cover for a covert 
message). It also may come about that the difference image is non-zero at some or every pixel. 
This would yield a difference image with "noise", showing - in the absence of two different 
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counterfeit images - that either (3) the first image is either counterfeit or steganographically 
injected with a message, or ( 4) the second image is counterfeit or likewise acting as a carrier of 
covert information. In fact, even in the absence of a true difference image existing in the 
world, it is entirely possible to fabricate a difference image, as has been put forth in the work 
of Zhang and Ping (Zhang & Ping, 2003). 
Given this fact, it becomes clear that in steganography, a common-cover carrier image 
must never be employed (we will see below, in coverage of Lou & Liu's work (Lou & Liu, 
2002), that great pains may be taken to defeat the common-cover carrier attack) - this has the 
same effect as re-using a one-time pad. Simply put, if an attacker is given enough views (here, 
only two identical cover images are necessary), it becomes possible to guess at the length of the 
messages or even attack the encoding or encipherment itself13. This being the case, any 
reasonable approach to steganography will make use of entirely different cover images (which 
will become important to keep in mind later, in Section 3, and if the same cover image must be 
used, then the sender would likely re-digitize the image to take advantage of noise in the 
hardware (as opposed to the artificial noise that is introduced by Lou & Liu), and would then 
be free to choose an appropriate unique cover image to use for communication. Aura dubs this 
process the selection method of invisibility (Tuomas Aura, 1996). 
2.2.3.4. Dynamic Encoding in LSB Insertion Systems 
Static LSB insertion methods are - at best - easily detected. Worse still, unfettered and 
unchecked static LSB insertions may lead to image artifacts that are visible to the human eye, 
thus raising suspicion. To counter this, the next step in LSB embedding saw dynamic LSB bit 
13 This second notion would give rise to finding a collision within the encryption routine. More information on 
this kind of attack against an encryption methodology may be found in Computer Security: Art and Science 
(Bishop, 2003). 
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encoding. This has been referred to as "hiding in the shadows", as this method makes an 
intelligent choice about what embedding bit size to use based upon the context of the pixel and 
its neighbors; this typically results in a good deal of covert data free to lurk in shadowed and 
contoured image features. It is important, at this juncture, to make note of certain high-level 
similarities between this and data (image) compression. In both arenas, the systems involved 
have become increasingly more robust and have worked in tandem with the human visual 
system, rather than against it, to achieve maximum data embedding (or compression) rates at a 
minimal degradation in the signal itself. For instance, today's steganography techniques 
(taking lessons learned from compression) are adaptive in their insertion mechanism (Lie & 
Chang, 1999), and even may make use of shadows and features such as natural contours or 
curves within the image (Lee & Chen, 2000), thus escaping visual inspection through 
compliance with the oblique effect in human vision ((Gray, Cosman, & Oehler, 1993)). 
Lie & Chang's work (Lie & Chang, 1999) took LSB encoding to new levels by 
adapting embedding rates with the image qualities, thus taking advantage of the human visual 
system. This is a crucial development to make, as it strives to work in harmony with a system 
that is more keenly able to pick out image artifacts than a machine-based method, depending 
upon the image context and the level of LSB embedding in use. However, there still existed 
the problem of providing good capacity within stego-imagery while also maintaining good 
image fidelity. As such, Lee & Chen (Lee & Chen, 2000) designed a model that achieves just 
this end. Lee & Chen used a dynamic-length LSB embedding methodology, and achieved 
greater than 50% capacity (above and beyond 4-LSB encoding), while maintaining image 
fidelity at a superior quality than a static 4-LSB embedding methodology. This is good news 
for LSB-based insertion, as it marries together the two seemingly disparate goals discussed 
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above, being preservation of image fidelity while increasing payload capacity. Yet, for all the 
good that their method did, it was found to be detectable when looking at the noise generated 
through compression artifacts. And this is where Lou & Liu come into play. Lou & Liu (Lou 
& Liu, 2002) further improved upon the Lee-Chen model of dynamic LSB embedding with the 
addition of Gaussian noise to the untouched image pixels, thus increasing the stego-image's 
survivability to a common-cover carrier attack. Even though this thesis is not going to use the 
common-cover carrier attack, favoring instead a more realistic (and much more difficult) zero-
knowledge approach, the import of the Lou-Liu extension to the Lee-Chen model of 
steganographic embedding is not lost here: this effectively takes away a trivially simple and 
accurate tool from an individual conducting steganalysis against the image. 
It must be noted at this point that, while LSB encoding schemes are easy to implement 
and potentially resistant to inspection, they suffer from being unsuitable for transmitting large 
amounts of information. To this end, Lin & Lee's Confused Document Encrypting Scheme 
(Lin & Lee, 1998) could be employed for text files, or Yeh & Hwang's approach (Yeh & 
Hwang, 2001) may be taken to extend the Confused Document Encrypting Scheme to utilize 
any digital file, while allowing the use of two-byte character-based languages (e.g. Chinese, 
Japanese, Korean). This research stream is mentioned here for completeness only, and to 
illustrate that n-LSB embedding of information has definite drawbacks in not only the domain 
of insertion, but also of the ontology itself. 
2.2.3.5. Beyond LSB: Frequency-Domain Encoding 
Given that even the most robust and dynamic LSB insertion scheme 1s prone to 
detection, recent publications have shied away from this topic, instead favoring a more covert 
mechanism for information hiding. It is important to take note that this relatively new 
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information hiding routine present in JPEG files is found within the file specification itself: 
use of the frequency-domain. As such, it is many times more infeasible and onerous to 
uncover information covertly hidden using this mechanism than using LSB insertions. 
Even though frequency-domain encoding is a more insidious method of covert data 
insertion into (JPEG) images, even this advanced breed of information hiding is not without 
attacks. In their 2001 work (Fridrich, Goljan, & Du, 2001), Fridrich et al. propose a method of 
steganalysis that can uncover tampering in the frequency domain - and even provide the 
potential for bit-level granularity - as well as discover if an image was ever presented in a 
JPEG format. This method of steganalysis is called JPEG compatibility, as it works with the 
JPEG algorithm to flag blocks that could not have been created within the confines of the 
quantizing mechanism, and are likely the result of frequency-domain information embedding. 
Indeed, for longer messages, it is possible to analyze the image and identify individual pixels 
that have been modified (Fridrich et al., 2001). This is a powerful, heady analysis, and as such 
suffers from computational intractability; the authors note this in the paper and acknowledge 
this as a limitation. Even with the computational difficulty of this method, the sky seemed the 
limit for steganalysis - as most digital images are, or had been at one time, JPEG files, the 
ability to detect embedding information to the pixel is powerful. However, this new-found 
steganalysis power was not to last long - ending abruptly at the hands of Richard Newmann 
and his co-authors (R. E. Newman, Moskowitz, Chang, & Brahmadesam, 2002). 
Newmann et al.'s paper (R. E. Newman et al., 2002) presents a novel approach to 
encoding - "[through encoding of] the embedded data in the spatial domain (bitmap) by 
manipulating the image in the frequency domain (the JPEG coefficients)" (R. E. Newman et 
al., 2002). The resulting image, as it hinges upon spatial information, may be saved as either a 
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JPEG or a BMP file without loss of (covert) information. This work is similar to that of 
Marvel et al., who proposed storing information in the quantized JPEG coefficients at a 
capacity of one bit per block (Marvel, Hartwig, & Boncelet, 2000), but for the fact that this 
work presents a notion of topological "closeness" as a determinate for data embedding. While 
this work minimizes detection, so too does it diminish the payload that may be embedded at 
one bit per usable14 8x8 block, a 640x480-pixel JPEG file could carry (assuming 95% usable 
blocks15) 4560 bits, or 570 bytes. However, if the payload can be kept small, then involved 
parties may be assured that this method is a much more robust and transparent one than any 
previously discussed. Furthermore, this method has the added advantage of not needing any 
additional domains than the spatial domain - which means that the cover image may be 
expressed as a BMP file without loss (or undue disclosure) of any information. 
W estf eld' s F5 algorithm (W estfeld, 2001) embeds bits in the DCT coefficients, thus 
minimizing the impact to the spatial domain of the cover image. The F5 algorithm marks an 
improvement over earlier iterations, called- appropriately enough-F4 and F3. F4 came about 
to replace the idiosyncrasies of the F3 algorithm (embedding of steganographic zeroes in a 
statistically detectable fashion, and the lopsided odd-even coefficient distribution within 
histograms of F3-embedded stego-imagery), by mapping zeroes and ones in a less predictable 
fashion (Westfeld, 2001). The F5 algorithm further improved upon the F4 algorithm by 
"spreading out" the covert message in the cover image through both permutive embedding 
(Westfeld, 2001) and through use of matrix encoding (Crandall, 1998) - F5 is regarded as 
being an early-adopter in this arena. However, F5 - by its very nature - alters the histogram of 
14 The authors did, however, find very few "poor" blocks, so at least the odds favor any given 8x8 pixel block 
being able to support one bit of data. 
15 An arbitrary figure, congruent with "very few" blocks being "poor", e.g. non-useable. 
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the DCT coefficients, a fact which is potentially exploitable by second-order statistical 
inspection. Yet the kind of analysis required to accurately and dynamically perform this kind 
of inspection warrants its own section, below, as this is clearly an advanced technique of 
steganalysis and thus separate from methods discussed to this point. 
2.2.3.6. Advanced Techniques of Steganalysis 
Currently, with computational power becoming increasingly more powerful and 
parallelizable, steganography and steganalysis are undergoing a sort of renaissance - this has 
culminated in the use of steganographic embedding techniques which are easily able to thwart 
the human visual system as well as first-order statistical modeling. Machine learning and data 
mining techniques are relatively new public entrants to the art of steganalysis. Rather than 
subjecting image files to a visual inspection, and then looking at histograms and DCT 
coefficient tables manually, today's advanced techniques utilize higher-order statistics and also 
making use of the concept of generalization, which can tell if image b is a candidate for 
steganographic embedding after being trained on images where the steganographic embedding 
technique present within b was not utilized. In essence, both data mining and machine learning 
techniques focus principally (for the purposes of image processing) on feature extraction, a 
concept under active research in mathematics. 
The first large machine learning initiative came from Lyu & Farid in 2002 (Lyu & 
Farid, 2002), and makes use of Support Vector Machines. However, the method outlined 
suffers greatly from problems typical and endemic to automating steganalysis - it relies heavily 
upon pre-processing techniques. In fact, this method has been specifically faulted for focusing 
on the "complex second order model built of the image" (Berg, Davidson, Duan, & Paul, 
2003). This is certainly not to say that it represents anything less than a breakthrough for the 
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field, as it is powerful; rather, the method is computationally cumbersome and time-intensive. 
For instance, this method is able to detect steganographic methods that work to correct 
distortions in first-order statistical distributions or transform coefficients - this fact alone 
makes the method robust against many current steganographic approaches. As was mentioned 
previously, this article was the first to make use of a true machine learning technique; one of 
the authors (Farid) did, however, make use of a Fisher linear discriminant (FLD) methodology 
in an earlier work (Farid, 2002), a method that suffers from its inability to solve non-linear 
problems. The support vector machine, though, can solve these problems and in doing so may 
also attain a finer resolution as well as solve problems that the FLD cannot (for a concrete 
example involving image classification, refer to the improvement of Table 2 over Table 1, in 
(Lyu & Farid, 2002)). 
The prior method discussed, while enjoying benefits of powerful analysis and low 
false-positive rate (l.0%), will naturally be eclipsed by methods requiring less pre-processing 
and raw computation - one such method is presented in the 2003 paper by Berg et al. (Berg et 
al., 2003), in which the back-propagation Artificial Neural Network approach (Rumelhart, 
Hinton, & Williams, 1986) routinely outperformed (or, in the worst case given, performed 
comparably to) the data mining methods of decision trees, naive Bayes classifiers, and a 
special-purpose program, StegDetect (Provos, 2004). Remember from the earlier discussion on 
Artificial Neural Networks that overtraining becomes a real problem in this kind of machine 
learning technique: an overtrained Neural Network is essentially one in which generalization 
is no longer possible. Berg et al. certainly get around this limitation by only sampling a total of 
150 images - 50 each of "flower", "mountain", and "tree" types. This is unfortunate, as with 
this small sample set and similar context, it is difficult to determine to what extent the Artificial 
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Neural Network is really working. Additionally, no information was given as to the naming 
convention (for instance) of the image files, nor was any information given to the scrubbing of 
"meta-information" present within the file, such as EXIF data. This is a potentially massive 
oversight, as the ANN learning technique can pick up on nuances like this (if presented), and 
their black-box nature makes it impossible to determine from what inputs, and how, its output 
comes into being. This key limitation aside, it is important to view this article in its more lax 
context: current steganalysis tools are becoming more complex, more adaptable, and better at 
detection of steganography. 
The solution presented by Berg et al. (Berg et al., 2003) is just one example of neural 
network technology being brought to bear on the problem of steganalysis: another such 
example also comes in 2003 (Shaohui, Hongxun, & Wen, 2003). A back-propagation 
Artificial Neural Network is utilized here, just as in Berg et al.'s article; it is so, quite frankly, 
because it works well for the task of feature extraction and image classification based on 
patterns and trends (it is for this reason that ANN s find use in all sorts of pattern-recognition 
tasks from weld inspection to leather and fabric process troubleshooting). Each image 
possessed 40 discrete statistics, and the ANN was trained on Chen's quantization index 
modulation method (Chen & Womell, 2001) of information embedding. However, as with the 
previous use of Artificial Neural Networks, this article also suffers from a lack of appropriate 
sample size (training on 23 and 21 images for "clean" and "stego-imagery" respectively) as 
well as a perhaps inappropriately small test dataset of only 40 (clean) and 41 (stego-) image 
files. The model accuracy displays precisely this criticism, achieving a false negative rate of 
14.6%, and a false positive rate of 25% (see Table 1 in (Shaohui et al., 2003)). The following 
year, the authors again published regarding the use of neural networks for image steganalysis 
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(Shaohui, Hongxun, & Wen, 2004). This time, however, the method was more keenly focused 
on wavelet texture analysis, utilizing the wavelet image transform much like Lyu & Farid's 
2002 work (Lyu & Farid, 2002), discussed above. The DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform) 
method is beyond the scope of this thesis, but suffice it to say that wavelets provide a 
contextually-rich analysis of the image, with use in image processing of (at least) analyzing 
"smoothness" of a given target. 
While current technologies m steganalysis tend to focus upon machine learning 
approaches, it is important to bear in mind that there still exists utility for alternate steganal ytic 
methods. For instance, image quality metrics (A vcibas, Memon, & Sankur, 2003), while 
currently out of favor, may certainly still be used to varying degrees of success. This is an 
important consideration to bear in mind, as it can be helpful in preventing research stream lock-
in and subsequent myopia with regard to other techniques and "best practices". 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
Digital image stegananalysis is a particularly difficult endeavor, as it crosses the major 
research domains of cryptography, image processing, and applied mathematics. Many models 
- both seminal and current - tend to focus upon one particular type of (typically academic) 
steganography to attack, and go to great lengths to create a large and cumbersome routine that 
will defeat this steganographic technique. While this approach makes for the academic 
advancement of the field as well as (rightfully so) bragging rights, these approaches typically 
do not provide much aid to the individual or corporation who may desire to uncover 
steganography present within image files in their possession. These approaches are - as 
measured both in CPU-time and deployment time - cumbersome and unwieldy, and the current 
state-of-the-art approach also relies heavily upon extensive and lengthy first- and second-order 
model-building to make a full and contextually rich description of the image file to the system 
(for a more thorough discussion of the faults in such a system, please refer to Berg et. al. (Berg 
et al., 2003), or back to Section 2.2.3.6). 
While these types of models have their place, this thesis aims to take a minimalist 
approach that is not found in the body of literature surveyed. This thesis, moreover, presents 
the following composite research question: "how little data is necessary for a data mining 
approach to give results that are both reasonable and fast, and how flexible and extensible is 
this model with respect to variable steganographic embedding techniques?". This is a valid 
and important concern, as well as a potentially viable path to take, given the fuller potential 
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context of the PIRANHA classification system as working with pluggable, small, and 
specialized blocks of analytical code rather than one monolithic classification routine. 
This thesis takes a relatively difficult road, as it focuses upon a zero-knowledge view of 
the image files. This means that there is no use of difference images, and also that, outside of 
training the artificial neural network, there exist no processes subsequent to that which "steg-
impregnates" image files that actually know if the image is a cover or stego-image or if the 
image is instead benign. fu fact, given the quality and properties of the vast majority of the 
files chosen (see Section 3.5.3), a human observer will also be hard-pressed to detect many of 
the stego-images as having anything untoward within them. 
Finally, it must be noted that the models generated and presented within this thesis have 
been created with the end-goal of classification run-time in mind. As such, the models that 
follow will intentionally err in favor of speed over accuracy, and will aim to present - with 
very broad and quick strokes - information that may help an observer determine when it may 
be potentially viable and worthwhile to utilize one of the more specialized and cumbersome 
steganalytical techniques discussed in Section 2.2.3.6. 
3.2. Image File Description 
3.2.1. JPEG File Specification 
As has been previously mentioned in Section 2.2.3.2, the JPEG file specification enjoys 
wide use for electronic imagery, due principally to its lossy compression routine providing 
typically high image fidelity and small file sizes. Of course, it is through the use of a quantizer 
(refer to Figure 2.1 and also (Wallace, 1991)) that JPEG imagery serves the needs of 
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steganography by providing a one-to-many mapping of values. Additionally, though use of the 
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), the image is actually comprised of two representations -
that of the human-perceivable bitplane in the spatial domain, and its analogous DCT-
perceivable coefficients in the frequency domain. As was ominously noted at the end of 
Section 2.2.3.2, this fact "has not gone unnoticed by either steganography or steganalysis 
researchers" - this thesis makes exclusive use of JPEG imagery due to both their wide 
acceptance and use as well as their additional properties that make them an ideal target for use 
as a covert communication channel. Furthermore, the use of a compressed image 
representation such as JPEG is fully compatible with Eggers, Bauml, and Girod's assertion that 
"uncompressed image data looks to Eve (the observer) as suspicious as encrypted data. Thus, 
the steganographic image r has to be always in a compressed format." (Eggers, Bauml, & 
Girod, 2002). 
3.2.2. Image Domains 
To this point, the notion that JPEG images have two domains has been discussed, but 
not explored. To wit, it is helpful to envision a block diagram, pictured in Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2, when thinking about JPEG imagery. We will begin by looking an overview of the 
DCT process in Figure 3.1, and follow this with an overview of the IDCT process in Figure 
3.2. 
Spatial Domain 
( e. g. Bitplane) 
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DCT Transform > 
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Figure 3.1- DCT Transform Process: From Bitplane to DC Coefficients 
Spatial Domain 
(e.g. Bitplane) 
< ,...---I_D_C_T_T_ran_s_fo_rm ___ ~ 
Frequency Domain 
Figure 3.2 - IDCT Transform Process: From DC Coefficients to Restored Bitplane 
As may be seen at a high level, the physical representation of the bitplane (e.g. in the 
Spatial Domain) is encoded into a series of equations in the Frequency Domain when a file is 
moved into JPEG format. Correspondingly, when the file is called upon for display, the 
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process is reversed by virtue of the Inverse DCT function, and the initial image is restored in 
the bitplane16. 
3.3. Transforms and Signal Processing Used 
Steganography, as has been touched on above, occurs when a signal makes use of a 
cover or "carrier" object to mask its presence. In this thesis, as JPEG files have been selected 
as the cover object, there exists the potential for image processing and transformation 
techniques to be used. 
3.3.1. Discrete Cosine Transform (OCT) 
The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is an integral component of the JPEG file 
specification. As noted before, it is a variant of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) that only 
includes the real components. Before launching into the equations that govern this process, it 
is handy to envision a block diagram of the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) process, as well 
as the Inverse Discrete Cosine Transform (IDCT) process that recovers the spatial-domain 
bitplane. In the following figures (Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5), let f denote a bound 
matrix of size M* N. 
f 
________ ..... g 
Figure 3.3 - g as a DCT off (Dougherty & Giardina, 1987) 
16 A word here is required about surreptitious manipulation of the DC coefficients. Then, while the image may 
well look the same and perform the same in the bitplane (by virtue of the quantizer), it will not be fandamentally 
the same image. This is a small point, but one that must be made salient. 
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g h 
Figure 3.4 - Recovery of h after IDCT(g) is executed (Dougherty & Giardina, 1987) 
f -----·~ h=f 
Figure 3.5 - When/ is saturated, h=IDCT(DCT(f))=/ (Dougherty & Giardina, 1987) 
With this broad overview in place, it is now possible to examine the transform at a lower level. 
The DCT off is formally given here in Equation 3.1: 
g =AJA' 
Equation 3.1 - g as a mathematical expression of DCT(f) (Dougherty & Giardina, 1987) 
A', above, is the transpose matrix of A. Matrix A has entries as follows below from Equation 
3.2: 
a.ik = 
1 
,fr;, for all k = 0 
[2 cos[(2j + l)kJr] for k = 1,2, ... ,n -1 
~-;; 2n ' j=0,1, ... ,n-1 
Equation 3.2 - Definition of Matrix A (Dougherty & Giardina, 1987) 
With the above notions contributing to a more complete understanding of the process, the DCT 
function may more simply be expressed as g = DCT(f) (Dougherty & Giardina, 1987). The 
equation that dictates a two-dimension DCT (as would be found in imagery) follows in 
Equation 3.3: 
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H(u ,v) = bc(u)C(v)I I: h(x,y)cos[C2x+l)uJZ"]cos[(2Y+l)vJr] 
'\/MN x=O y=O 2M 2N 
Equation 3.3 - 2D Discrete Cosine Transform (Crane, 1997) 
Very briefly, it may be said that images may be broken down into a set of basic 
functions with the DCT - this implies, therefore, that an image's bitplane presentation in the 
spatial domain is embodied by a summation of basis functions present within the frequency 
domain. I would like to talk very briefly about the meaning of the word "basis" used in the 
above sentence; its inclusion is not a typographical error. Rather, basis functions come about 
from the realization that if values can be pre-computed for given N and M values, then "blocks" 
of input signals may be transformed much more rapidly than finding these end values through 
computation. As JPEG is a block-based image routine, this principle holds here. JPEG makes 
use of 8x8 pixel blocks, which are then fed into the convolution mask that results from pre-
computation - resulting in a vastly improved runtime for the transform. The DCT basis 
functions are illustrated in Figure 3.6. It is important to further realize that these pre-
computations essentially represent weighted averages of the DCT functions. Compression may 
be achieved by weighting more of these averages as "O", or image fidelity (at the expense of 
size) may be realized by setting these weights away from 0 and closer to the actual value of 
their constituent pixels. With this realization made, it becomes a trivial cognitive task to see 
that where compression may be achieve, so too may data hiding. In fact, working within the 
JPEG file specification in this manner, Derek Upham' s Jsteg algorithm (Upham, 1999) 
achieves covert data hiding. 
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Figure 3.6 - The 64 DCT Basis Functions for an 8x8 Matrix 
3.3.2. Histogram (grayscale values) 
An image histogram is a plot of the color value (here, in an 8-bit grayscale image file, 
this is within the bounds of [0,255]) against the number of pixels having that particular color 
value. For instance, a black-and-white (1 bit) image would yield a histogram that is essentially 
a bar graph with only two categories - the "height" of the bars would represent the numbers of 
pixels having a particular color value (white or black in this example), and the individual bar 
would correspond to the color value itself. Here, however, the data are diverse and varied 
enough in both color value and count to allow for meaningful statistical measures to be 
conducted on it. For instance, the simple measures used here for the histograms of images 
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were minimum, maximum, variance, and standard deviation. These values create a rough 
approximation of the distribution of color (gray values) within the image, and are useful even 
here. I say even here because there are specific and known steganography algorithms (one 
example that comes immediately to mind isjsteg, (Upham, 1999)) that rather radically alter the 
histograms of the images that they use as cover-images. 
3.4. Equipment 
3.4.1. Personal Computer Used 
For the research, a stand-alone personal computer was used. The hardware consisted of 
a Pentium® 4 3.0GHz processor running on an ASUS motherboard with lGB of RAM and 
250GB hard disk space. With the problem space being potentially vast - with respect to 
sample size, number of image attributes, and epochs through training - this level of COTS 
hardware, while strictly more than is absolutely necessary, helps ensure a "reasonable" runtime 
with each iteration through training. 
3.4.2. Conversion, Analysis, and Modeling Software Used 
Image files were converted to 8-bit grayscale 75% quality JPEG files - both with and 
without optimal Huffman encoding - through use of Advanced Batch Converter (Gold-
Software, 2004 ). 8-bit grayscale images were used as a result of current "best practices" that 
have evolved out of a need to minimize the impact on the human visual system. 8-bit grayscale 
imagery meets this demand "because grayscale values change gradually from palette entry to 
palette entry" (T. Aura, 1995), whereas color images typically do not see this 1- or 2-shade 
palette differentiation. In instances in which image rotation was necessary, Advanced Batch 
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Converter was also utilized in a two-pass manner consisting of rotating images and then, after 
copying these rotated and resized images to another directory, resizing the remaining images 
and merging the two image sets. While this is a cumbersome constraint to endure, the software 
did not enable the two to take place in the same pass. Although this is an important (and time-
consuming) drawback to be aware of, the software performed the task of "batch converting" 
the image files admirably. Matlab Student Version 14 with SPl (The MathWorks, 2004) was 
used to read in the image and create image attribute matrices, as well as harvest DCT 
coefficients from the images. In addition to the Matlab core component, the Image Processing 
plugin was used, to provide for some finer-grained analysis as well as DCT extraction. Matlab 
is a well-known and trusted tool for engineering problems, and is routinely used for image 
analysis and model-building, which makes it an excellent candidate for this kind of work -
while a tool to perform image analysis in this thesis could have been written from scratch, such 
"home-grown" tools have not been iteratively scrutinized for years as Matlab has. Instead, 
however, of using Matlab to build the predictive model, Weka (Witten, Frank, & Kaufmann, 
2000) version 3.4.3 was used to both grow and validate the Artificial Neural Network model 
that was created in this thesis. Weka has a fairly well-defined track record as being a 
serviceable and worthwhile tool for data mining, and has the added advantage of being 
provided free of charge. 
3.5. Image Preparation 
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3.5.1. Image Description 
Initially, a set of 747 images was gathered from known "good" sources. "Goodness" 
here presents the notion that these images were guaranteed to be free of prior steganographic 
message embedding. This is an important constraint to ensure, as having an image set that is 
known to be free from steganography is vital to the validity of the models built, below. 
Gathering nearly 1,000 of these images was no easy task, and I thank the individuals listed 
below who kindly gave me use of their images in this project. Images consisted of the 
following, listed in descending number of images provided: 
• JPEG images of England and Reiman Gardens, taken by myself over the summer of 
2004. 
• JPEG images of varying architectural and natural scenes, expertly photographed by Phil 
Greens pun 17. 
• TIFF images from the USC-SIPI Image Database (California), a de facto standard 
purveyor of digital "test" images. 
• JPEG images, provided courtesy of Juan C. Melendez, taken on vacation in Europe. 
• JPEG images, provided courtesy of Tom Hauppenthal and taken by him in the summer 
of 2003 while on vacation. 
• JPEG images of Iowa State University, taken by myself upon arrival in Ames, Iowa. 
• JPEG images from Compuworks' Super Graphics Collection CD. 
• JPEG images from Corel' s Professional Photos Sampler CD. 
17 Images were used with the express and kind permission of Philip Greenspun, at http://philip.greenspun.com/ 
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3.5.2. Image Size 
Images were resized to 640x480 pixels or 320x240 pixels. These file sizes represent a 
balance between both realism and image manageability, respectively. These sizes are also 
typical with respect to consumer-grade digital photography. Additionally, having all images a 
standard size allows for Kurak's 1992 Image Downgrading (Kurak & McHugh, 1992) 
mechanism to be utilized in the form of Matlab code18, wherein a cover image masks a "secret" 
image, using pixel-by-pixel n-LSB embedding. Finally, this approach also prevents, in the 
event that an interested party wanted to train an Artificial Neural Network or SVM to look at 
the pixel values of the spatial domain themselves, the first few neurons in the Artificial Neural 
Networks used from becoming overtrained while the last few neurons would be undertrained. 
While many images were rotated (to keep with the 640x480 pixel profile), some images 
retained their portrait ( 480x640) layout. 
3.5.3. Image Context 
Images chosen consisted largely of natural scenery, due both to their textured quality -
which, remember from the discussion in both Section 2.2.3.3 (stemming from (Kurak & 
McHugh, 1992)) - as well as survivability from inspection by the human visual system (from 
Wayner, below). Whenever possible, faces and skin-tones were not utilized, as the human eye 
is expert at spotting skin-tones and facial features that are unnatural. This truth, in tum, sharply 
contrasts with the human visual system's tolerance for examining leaves in a tree that are one 
or two shades "off' (Wayner, 1996). The images were stripped of EXIF information (which is 
meta-information contained within the image file; typically, this can contain information about 
the camera or program that was utilized to create the image), as inclusion of this information 
18 Adapted from Fabien A.P. Petitcolas' Matlab code, electronically available at 
http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/steganography/i mage downgrading/code.html. 
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and its use might bias the Artificial Neural Network in its weighting and decision-making 
metrics and therefore skew the results to either favor or abhor images with EXIF information 
present. 
3.5.4. Image Selection 
Images were hand-selected by the author to present both a wide variety of image 
"texture" (see Section 2.2.3.3) as well as a sound representation of images that may be found in 
current circulation and used as innocuous carriers. Fractal and computer-generated images 
were not used, as these equation-constrained and computer-generated images have statistical 
properties that may be rather predictable, and may end up skewing the output. Images with 
large, smooth areas of either sky or water were, on the whole, avoided. All individuals present 
within the images used in this thesis gave their express consent to the author, and I again wish 
to thank them for their time and likeness. It is important to take note that none of the images 
were "histogram-equalized", as this would make analysis largely invalid through the creation 
of a data mining rule that would predict "stego-image" whenever a non-normal histogram 
(derived from the Min, Max, Mean, and Standard Deviation of the histogram) was presented to 
the data mining system. This does, however, make for some images which are a bit more dark 
than they "ought" to be, or otherwise similarly uneven in their contrast. This is intentional, as 
it both preserves data quality and upholds the results obtained from data mining, and also is 
representative of many consumer-grade digital imaging devices and users - indeed, the author 
himself does not attest to be much good with a camera, and suspects that most causal users of 
the technology likely fall into this category. 
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3.5.5. Image Warehousing, Format, and Storage 
Images were first brought into the system from a variety of sub-directories ("folders") 
in a specified thesis directory on a computer hard drive. This folder, and all the images within 
it, were then marked "read-only" to prevent possible tampering or loss. After the images were 
warehoused on a personal computer, the files were converted to grayscale and resized and then 
written to a directory that was named according to the size and JPEG options present within the 
files (e.g. "640x480 greyscale with optimal huffman codes" was a directory that housed images 
used in the analysis, as was "320x240_greyscale_ without_optimal_huffman_codes"). All 
images were saved with an initial JPEG quality of 75, which is representative of the vast 
majority of typical JPEG imagery on the Internet and in personal use, and were varied 
according to size (640x480 or 320x240 pixels) and Huffman code ordering (optimized or not). 
Additionally, all resize operations took place from the original image, and all steganography 
operations were taken on the derived image - this helps combat unnecessary image degrading 
and quantization effects, respectively. 
3.5.6. Image Naming Convention (and why this is important) 
The images, in their respective directories, were renamed [1-747].jpg. This 1s an 
important step to take, as it enables programmatic examination of all image files in a directory 
through opening the directory, and then looping from 1 to 747 (Matlab 1-indexes loops) to 
examine each file individually. This makes for a rapid and lightweight program, and does 
away with complex and cumbersome (and potentially dangerous) string parsing. Additionally, 
this also aids in the creation of a meaningful and readable output file, as the record number will 
relate exactly to the image that the record represents (e.g. the 49th element in the dataset will 
correspond to attributes gathered from the file "49 .jpg"). This makes it easy to track and 
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explain image statistics, and also lowers the bar of entry for an outside observer to make sense 
of the Matlab code used to generate the summary statistical measures and output files. 
3.6. Model-Building and Validation 
3.6.1. High-Level Description and Process Flow 
For this thesis, two "image steg-impregnating" Matlab modules were created, as well as 
modules to analyze all files in a directory and then roll these observations into a comma-
separated file for later data mining and analysis. At a few points in the Matlab modules, the 
choice was made to favor ease of use over runtime by actually invoking a shell to run the steg-
impregnating routine (e.g. Hetzl's steghide (Hetzl, 2003)). This approach, where taken, 
supersedes a more primitive batch-file creation, as by creating a shell instance within Matlab, 
error detection (e.g. generic file-system "file not found", or task-specific "steghide: the cover 
file is too short to embed the data" errors) and - admittedly - primitive correction is 
implemented. Where this approach is taken, it is indicative that there exists a non-trivial 
chance of the embedding routine to fail. Modules are intentionally kept specialized and small, 
in an effort to increase future viability for the extension of PIRANHA into a classification 
system that is supported by modules that are specialized, fast, and discrete while at the same 
time being self-supporting and sufficient. Currently, two small modules have been written to 
impregnate (dubbed "poison" or "infect" in the comments of the Matlab programs) images -
these two modules make use of the image downgrading method outlined in Kurak (Kurak & 
McHugh, 1992), and Hetzl's steghide program (Hetzl, 2003), and are named Steg_nLSB.m19 
19 For a file listing, please refer to Appendix A. 
48 
and Steghide.m20 respectively. The creation of these modules was deemed necessary to 
automate and randomize, without prior knowledge or bias with respect to the image file, the 
steganographic embedding of a covert signal (an image file in Steg_nLSB, and a text file - in 
fact, 2Kb of text from the Literature Review of this thesis - in Steghide ). 
In addition to handling and tracking individual file infection, the m-files built also 
handle sundries of directory and file checking and output directory and file creation. This last 
portion is an important observation to make, as with the naming conventions in use (context-
specific and rich with regard to image contents), having the program control the naming 
scheme greatly reduces human error from inadvertent mis-classification. For instance, an 
operator may be thinking about the last run and lose track of the test set being encoded with 
optimized Huffman values or not - this may lead to a gross mis-classification that would result 
from running a testing set from A against an Artificial Neural Network trained on B. In short, 
attempts have been made to remove the human from the loop and automate where possible -
yet a keen eye was kept turned toward providing meaningful, intuitive, and engaging output. 
In this vein, visualization and output from the tool is limited, to err on the side of cognitive 
simplicity. Examples of this philosophy are demonstrated in Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8, Figure 3.9, 
and Figure 3.10. 
Please wait, 3-LSB infecting files: .. (chance to infect 33%) 
Figure 3.7 - Steg_nLSB.m Process Visualization, 33% Infection Rate (3-LSB insert) 
2° For a file listing, please refer to Appendix B. 
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Please wait;' 4-LSB infecting files ... (chance to infect G3%) 
Figure 3.8 - Steg_nLSB.m Process Visualization, 33% Infection Rate (4-LSB insert) 
">< "° "-~ 0 
··) <Student Version> ~l u l~ 
",:'_ '·-~ :c.:.i :;~· 
lease wait, StegHide infechng files:·· (chanc'e toLinfect: 33%) 
- I ~ 
Figure 3.9 - StegHide Process Visualization 
·) <Student Version> ~}q :r:8J 
Figure 3.10 - ANNPreProcess.m Process Visualization (note: Matlab subscripts "_x") 
Current! y, the files that generate the above listed types of cover images have a 
multitude of user-defined options (such as image directory, how many bits to use, and so on), 
and do not copy the "clean" files from the set in question to the target directory. This is an 
important observation to note, as it means that, for now, there is still a bit of "hands-on" work 
involved. However, these programs are fluid and undergoing revision - as such, future 
versions will contain a multitude of time-saving improvements and run in a more laissez faire 
fashion. 
After images are "infected" with a chosen steganographic method, the two methods 
discussed above write a file, infected.csv, to the target directory - this file is a comma-separated 
file and represents a list (vector) of all the files that have been infected in the form of integer 
values. A word here is necessary about the randomization routine used to choose images to 
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infect: simply comparing the absolute value of a random number in the range of (0,1] (the 
former bound being programmatically enforced) to the user-defined variable 
CHANCE_TO_INFECT (in the range of [0,1], with 0.33 - 33% - a typical choice) and seeing 
if the file matching a randomly-selected file (between 1 and 747 here) should be infected is not 
sufficient. It was discovered early on that, without clamping, Matlab would happily - although 
statistically improbably - infect every file in the directory without regard to the bounding 
constraint (through the use of a logical check of abs( rand)> CHANCE_TO_INFECT without 
further restriction). As such, a more rigorous test involving a comparison between both the 
"chance to infect" condition and the total number of infected files being capped at 
(CHANCE_TO_INFECT*747) of the total files - in short, enforcing the number of infected 
files to remain under a user-defined infection percentage. The Matlab code that achieved this 
used a bitwise AND that is used by a unary selection if statement. It is after this process has 
completed that the infected.csv file is written to the chosen output directory. At this point, the 
onus is currently on the end user to copy the remaining files (the uninfected files) in the current 
image set (e.g. 320x240 with optimized Huffman values; 640x480 without optimized Huffman 
values ... ) over to the target directory defined in the chosen steg-impregnating routine, 
choosing to not overwrite existing (the infected) files in the directory. Finally, the results 
(image files) must be analyzed and a file suitable for data mining must be generated from the 
analysis. This process takes place within the m-file module called ANNPreprocess.m21 . This 
file, as I have broadly defined it doing in an in-file comment, is "Used to preprocess JPEG 
images for running through an ANN". It is in this file that the image processing calls - such 
that they are - take place, and it is in this file that simple and efficient statistical measures of 
21 For a file listing, please refer to Appendix C. 
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the images are created. Finally, this method creates output that will be used in the next stage of 
the problem. 
The output consists of several files: a comma-separated header file involving names of 
statistical measures used in the analysis of spatial-domain elements (bitplane_headers.txt), to 
be used as the header of a comma-separated file containing the data from these statistical 
measures ({Input Directory Name}.bitplane_stats.csv), and their corresponding analogues 
which make use of image histograms (hist_headers.txt and {Input Directory 
Name}.histogram_stats.csv). These files may be analyzed separately or, for enhanced 
detection, in conjunction with each other (this step requiring a manual cut-and-paste from one 
file to the other). Finally, these resulting comma-separated files are utilized by the data mining 
program (here, Weka). 
In keeping with the minimalist approach, the files are comprised very simply, as 
follows in Table 3.1: 
Generalized Number of Number of Observations Attributes Attributes22 File Name (Rows) (Columns) 
Entropy, Mean, 
StDev, VMax, 
VMin, VMean, 
.bitplane_stats.csv (input images) 7 StDev2, CLASS 
HistMAX, HistMIN, 
HistMEAN, 
HistSTDEV, 
HistV ARIANCE, 
.histogram_stats.csv (input images) 5 HistCLASS 
Entropy, Mean, 
StDev, VMax, 
VMin, VMean, 
StDev2, HistMAX, 
.merged_stats.csv (input images) 12 HistMIN, 
22 Not including the BugFixForWEKA column that is removed prior to processing. 
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HistMEAN, 
HistSTDEV, 
HistV ARIANCE, 
CLASS 
Table 3.1 - Composition of Data Mining Input Files 
It should be noted that these files include a "dummy column" labeled 
BugFixForWEKA. This is intentional, as a bug (unreported, to my knowledge) was found in 
my experimentation with W eka - the last attribute in a data file cannot be converted from a 
numeric value (such as the "O" and "1" scheme in-use here, which relate to the observation 
coming from a file that was either known to be innocuous or known to be a stego-image, 
respectively) to a nominal value - which, as it happens, is precisely the data type necessary for 
use of an Artificial Neural Network (or any number of classification schemes) in Weka. Hence 
the inclusion of the "dummy attribute" for Weka - this ensures that the classification (steg-
infected versus innocuous) variable moves to the second-to-last attribute value in the dataset, 
and enables it to be converted to a nominal value, which may then be examined by W eka. 
One last note must be made about this process: the resulting data mining set is found to 
yield consistent results despite dataset ordering, thus providing support for the premise that the 
model is indeed providing consistent analysis based upon the selected and reported image 
attributes. The end-to-end process, involving three distinct stages, is graphically outlined in 
Figure 3.11: 
Infection Stage 
Pluggable Infection 
Module(s) 
Steghide.m 
Steg_nLSB.m 
00 
Clean Image Files Infected Image Files 
l__ Remaining Clean _j 
Files Copied 
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Data Minfug Stage 
Data Mining Module( s) 
to read . CSV dataset. 
Examination 
of files 
Figure 3.11 - Process Overview 
3.6.2. Artificial Neural Networks as a Methodology 
Weka 
Artificial Neural Networks were chosen as a data mining and classification 
methodology due to their (inherent) flexibility and ability to pick up sometimes obscure 
patterns, and also their use in classical image processing. Artificial Neural Networks work in a 
manner roughly analogous to a biological neural network, and a BackPropegation Artificial 
Neural Network, such as was used in this thesis, is able to "learn" by back-propagating errors 
through the network and adjusting weights of between-node synapses. The number of nodes -
along with the number of epochs, or iterations, that the neural network is trained over -
determines the complexity and subsequent accuracy of the network. An ANN with zero hidden 
layers, remember, is known as a Perceptron, and is unable to correctly classify the outputs for 
linearly inseparable problems, such as the functioning of an XOR logic gate. The number of 
hidden layers in an Artificial Neural Network, after the first, do not typically add to the overall 
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accuracy of the network. The total number of hidden layers in the neural network used in this 
. l (Attributes+ Classes )J thesis was 1, and each neural network had a total of 
2 
(here, this 
varied between 6 and 7) nodes, depending upon the number of attributes in the data set. An 
Artificial Neural Network representative of those used in this thesis (with attribute names) is 
shown in Figure 3.12. 
Figure 3.12 - Typical Artificial Neural Network Used 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. System Output and Analysis 
4.1.1. Runtime 
Runtime is an important consideration in an application such as this, and as such has 
been tracked and reported. Using Kurak's Image Downgrading LSB insertion routine, 
performing 4-LSB insertions into a JPEG file without optimized Huffman encoding takes the 
most time, and performing 3-LSB insertions into a JPEG file without optimized Huffman 
encoding takes the least amount of time. This is graphical! y depicted in 
Table 4.1 via the minimum, mean, and maximum runtimes respectively. The problem 
set was then sent to the ANN Pre-Processor, where image processing measures were recorded 
to comma-separated files for later analysis. Appendix H demonstrates that the relationship 
between data type and time taken uncovered above remains unchanged in this operation. The 
full data, with standard deviation (in seconds; not shown in Appendix For Appendix G) for the 
insertions, were as follows in Table 4.1. 
lma2e Embedding via Image Down2radin2 
LSB Optimal Min Mean Max St Dev 
Huffman 
3 1 0 0.045264 0.39 0.065666 
4 1 0 0.05043 0.281 0.071126 
3 0 0 0.043424 0.266 0.061044 
4 0 0 0.058083 0.422 0.083564 
ANN Pre-Processor Time 
Optimal 
LSB Huffman Min Mean Max St Dev 
3 1 0.031 0.047775 0.157 0.011826 
4 1 0.031 0.047898 0.109 0.011097 
3 0 0.031 0.049111 0.109 0.011438 
4 0 0.031 0.052186 0.203 0.015229 
Table 4.1 - Min, Mean, Max, Standard Deviation of runtimes for LSB Insertions 
56 
These times are given in seconds, and refer to the total amount spent in the working 
loop of the program. 
4.1.2. ANN Modeling Accuracy 
There is, of course, much more to the time taken by the system than just runtime. 
There is also the question of model-building, which is potentially lengthy using an Artificial 
Neural Network. 
The resulting comma-separated data files relating to the bitplane and histogram 
representations of the image were then manually merged into a data set having columns 
comprising of all attributes from the bitplane file and all histogram attributes from the 
histogram file. This was done because it was found that the lift and gain in the model made 
this worthwhile, and the extra information may be used to derive information that neither set 
could predict on their own. 5-fold validation was used in the creation of the Artificial Neural 
Network, and each ANN was trained for a period of 5000 epochs. 5-fold validation ensures 
model robustness by using 115 of the training set as a holdout, and rotating this holdout 
throughout the training cycle. This ensures that any local oddities have a chance to "work 
themselves out", and is a commonly-accepted method of both proving and increasing model 
robustness in data mining. However, nothing comes free - the time involved in training an 
ANN in this fashion is onerous compared to more traditional methods of data partitioning to 
create a testing, training, and (optionally) holdout set. A training period of 5000 iterations 
(epochs) seems a good figure23 , as observation of the ANN has shown that at this value, the 
ANN has found a global minimum on the error curve, and oscillations are reasonably well-
controlled. Short of using a genetic algorithm to train the ANN to train over a maximally 
23 Although, in the case of Steghide, lift is seen when the ANN is trained using only 500 epochs. 
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effective period of epochs, this is the most direct and intuitive method and yields fair results. 
During the ANN training period, CPU utilization stayed around 67% - as has been mentioned 
before, an Artificial Neural Network is a powerful data mining tool, as is evidenced by its 
resource use and comparatively slow speed, and also its ability to positively identify images 
amidst only 12 image descriptors (one of which, CLASS, only is used for training the 
network). 
Results of the model training on like members are shown in Appendix E. However, 
just as important (and much more interesting and potentially fruitful in a zero-knowledge 
analysis scenario) is the cross-classification that may occur between data sets - for instance, a 
suitable question to ask is, have I managed to train the neural network with enough epochs to 
make it able to accurately classify new data of the same or similar type while not over-training 
it? The answer to this may be found by loading an individual, previously trained, Artificial 
Neural Network model against data that it has never seen before. Additionally, there will be 
some "cross-classification" that occurs, say, between all static n-LSB insertion methods, given 
the same (or nearly same) end objective. It is certainly not unreasonable to expect that an 
Artificial Neural Network used in this manner may yield a good degree of accuracy. As such, 
the following "cross-classifications" were run, and show up in the Appendix E. Lift is seen 
over initial "auto-predictions" through use of what I will coin "xeno-modelling" - in short, this 
lends credence to the fact that the models created are not overtrained and are also flexible 
enough to pick up similar nuances that they have already deduced from their limited training 
set to make decisions about new data. This is exciting, as it demonstrates that in a model built 
upon only 12 image and image histogram attributes, there still exists generalization (of course) 
while also providing afair level of True Positives with respect to a classification of "Infected". 
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This last portion is crucial, as this model should strive to maximize True Positives of 
"Infected" images while reducing false alarms - in effect, when the model reports an alarm, 
there exists a fairly good chance that there is actually something there. It must also be pointed 
out that through use of models from disparate and disjoint types of n-LSB hiding routines, it is 
likely possible to produce classification for models, given that there exists some overlap of 
mechanism (or, alternatively, model-perceived mechanism). 
4.2. System Uniqueness 
The method outlined in this thesis is unique in its simplicity and attempt to find a 
minimal model that is effective across both its own data set, and (ideally) also when examining 
output from other data sets within its same general method of steganographic encoding. In 
Appendix E there are several rather dark (15% gray) rows - these rows show prediction 
classification for Steghide using the method outlined in Kurak, as well as the reverse scenario 
of using methods from Kurak to predict Steghide. It would be expected that little overlap 
would exist between these methods, and the outcome in Appendix E mirrors this assumption. 
This is appropriate, as the two methods used in this thesis are fundamentally and mechanically 
dissimilar. The methods utilized between the two are different enough in both structure and 
function such that the use of an Artificial Neural Network is absolutely necessary to even begin 
to search for possible overlap between the two. However, it also is instructive to note that the 
model does not completely fail - rather, it just provides no additional information about the 
target that has not already been gathered through the target's own ANN. Given this, it is likely 
that a model built upon steganographic embedding mechanisms could potentially detect a 
similar type of a steganographic scheme in use - such as may exist between a dynamic 
insertion model constrained to use 3- and 4-LSB insertions, and the Lie-Chang steganographic 
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model. This is, in itself, exciting as it opens the theoretical door for finding "primitives" or 
"roots" of different methods - in effect, a new module would only have to be written for a 
primitive or root of any given steganographic scheme, and not to detect each module itself. 
This is the first time, in the author's experience, that this notion has been discussed in print as 
being potentially fruitful. It is likely that this vantage point also runs in parsimony with the 
notion of finding the smallest model that will yield reasonable results - steganalysis is typically 
in publication seen as a specialized type of image analysis, and it may be that this view lends 
itself to honing in on one single, optimized and robust solution that will work for one and only 
one steganographic method. In short, this is unique in its attempt to lay the groundwork for 
potentially attacking families of steganographic methods, and grouping modules such that 
families of families may be attacked - and recursively continuing in this fashion until, 
ultimately, it becomes a generalized classification scheme for all steganography. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
5.1. Summary 
The steganalytic methods tested against m this thesis conform to LSB insertion 
methods, yet are vastly different in their payload capacity as well as ease of detection. It is to 
be expected that the method discussed in Kurak's seminal A Cautionary Note On Image 
Downgrading, yielding the highest possible payload capacity of 50%, would also be the easiest 
to unmask. 
This - on the whole - holds true, as the algorithm works by removing the n least-
significant bits from the cover image and replacing them with the n most-significant bits of the 
embedded image file. Levels employed for n in this thesis were 3 and 4, representing the two 
main levels at which LSB insertion methods are utilized. It is especially important, when using 
this algorithm, to make careful selection with regard to a cover image - an image that is 
"smooth" or otherwise lacking in contextual features is readily defeated through human 
inspection. Yet, if this constraint is obeyed, it is astonishing how innocuous an infected image 
may appear - even when half (4-LSB) or 318 (3-LSB) of the image is absent. The images in 
Appendix D are demonstrative of this effect - it is important to consider, too, that I chose a 
secret image with strongly-defined borders and edges; this makes it considerably easier for 
visual detection (but not necessarily so for machine detection). 
It is instructive to note that 7.jpg, having a reasonably smooth and uniform surface (the 
water), fails to survive use as both a 3- and 4-LSB-based stego-image. However, it is also 
equally important to note that, through intelligent choices in the context involved in the carrier 
files, 12.jpg and 23.jpg survive progressively better, with the 3-LSB attacked 23.jpg file giving 
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very little insight to the fact that anything is amiss - the image quality isn't the best, but on 
inspection this could be dismissed as quantization or interpolation artifacts. 
Additionally, the second instance of 7.jpg listed in Appendix D demonstrates the 
significantly more covert hiding that is achievable via Steghide. In this particular file 
(640x480, without optimal Huffman encoding), the 2KB text file discussed earlier (a portion of 
the Literature Review of this thesis) was embedded in the image. The initial image was 
27 .9.KB in size, thus yielding a payload size of 7 .17% with respect to the initial image size. 
The resulting image is 28. lKB, and survives visual inspection. The text has been both 
compressed and encrypted (with a blank pass-phrase), as well as being error-checked by 
Steghide. Using a non-zero-knowledge based approach, and given a known clean (or different) 
version of the file, it would be possible to examine how the two differed and from this be able 
to extract information from the stego-image. However, as this is also encrypted, classical 
cryptography would have to be employed in order to recover the embedded message. 
To bring this discussion full-circle, this thesis has demonstrated that a classification 
system for steganalysis may also take the form of a minimalist model in which compact and 
specialized modules may work in concert to yield fair insight into potentially fruitful image 
classification, wherein suspect images may then be subject to far more intensive and 
cumbersome image analysis and feature extraction techniques. 
5.2. Discussion of Findings 
The findings, although perhaps not as robust as current cutting-edge and special-
purpose steganalytic models in publication, suggest that there may indeed be some kernel of 
interest involved in finding models that are both computationally and intellectually lightweight 
and straightforward, while at the same time using many small components to examine and 
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classify images as opposed to components that are both monolithic and cumbersome. It is 
interesting, too, to note that these results lend themselves rather well to the notion of 
steganographic family and/or primitive discovery and classification. Ideally, given a 
lightweight model that can more fully represent images while at the same time keeping data 
volume low, the individual detection and classification modules ought to be able to more fully 
and richly explore this notion than models currently in publication. 
5.3. Limitations of the study & Future Work 
This study is an exploratory probe into what will hopefully become a full-scale 
classification engine for stego-imagery. As such, I have presented two very different 
instantiations of steganographic embedding using n-LSB insertions. This thesis is intentionally 
limited in scope, and therefore is constrained analysis of these two methods. Future work will 
result in the conditions covered in the sections below being achieved. 
5.3.1. Pluggable modules 
The strength of this hinges upon the ease of writing a series of pluggable modules for 
analysis and classification. Currently, the implementation of the modules utilized in this thesis 
is too hands-on and cognitively taxing on an end user. For instance, there is a good deal of 
hands-on work that is carried out with respect to merging data sets for later analysis through an 
ANN that should be automated in future revisions of the general model given in this thesis. It 
is hoped that, in order to avoid software lock-in, a future revision will include the provision of 
an entire ANN toolbox or module suite, rather than use of any static tool. In short, in future 
revisions, it would be exciting to allow a user to either "roll their own" ANN software, or go 
with any open- or closed-source offering and also have the image analysis engine (with its 
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pluggable modules) automatically feed the ANN software with appropriate data, and track and 
ideally visualize the results accordingly. 
5.3.2. Open system 
One main goal of the end-to-end design of the system was that it remain as open and 
transparent as possible. In its current form, a user is chained to Matlab for image analysis and 
processing. While this is not a bad move to make (as Matlab is an excellent closed-source 
tool), it would be more in meeting with the spirit of this thesis to allow for an entirely 
pluggable tool to work for the end user. For instance, SciLab or even a home-grown image 
analysis engine would ideally be able to "plug in" to the engine in the future, and provide 
interoperability between all connected components. 
5.3.3. Flexible architecture 
The models and methods run in this thesis were housed on a single computer. 
However, due to the perceived volume and complexity of future applications, it is imperative 
that future revisions of the engine be open to grid and cluster computing - both PYM and MPI 
- and ideally include a visualization tool or plug-in module that would enable a user to actively 
examine the computing nodes and manually assign jobs to each node. The default action, 
however, ought to be a dynamic and balanced job task being disseminated throughout the grid. 
Ideally, the hardware used should be transparent, and the system should run identically (albeit 
possibly magnitudes slower) on a single home machine as on a large grid or supercomputing 
cluster. There are, of course, problems well beyond the scope of this thesis - or even the end-
goal of this project - endemic with grid and cluster-based computing, but the PIRANHA 
engine should at least strive to make its components and open, flexible, and architecture-
independent as possible. Ideally, too, there would exist some sort of a control language that 
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would be used within the PIRANHA end environment that would then make use of compilers 
present upon the end system(s) to build and tune appropriate modules as needed. 
5.3.4. Hardware Implementation 
Whenever working within the confines of software on a complex problem, it is 
naturally tempting to look to hardware optimization whenever possible. For instance, in a 
heavily-laden implementation of PIRANHA tasked with viewing a large number of image files 
(as may be found in a PIRANHA engine running on a system within a network aggregation 
point), specialized hardware may and should be used to preserve response time. One idea that 
comes to mind would utilize either PIC or FPGA chip technology, such that an end-user could 
potentially either write or contract specialized detection and classification modules, and bum 
these modules to the PIC or FPGA. After which, these modules would be installed in high-
density configurations on expansion cards (e.g. PCI) to be placed within a chassis, such that 
each chassis could have many cards. Then, of course, a rack would ideally be filled with these 
special-purpose systems, and if the need were great enough, then many racks could be 
implemented. However, the success of this view hinges upon the constraints of flexible 
architecture and pluggable modules being met, as well as the ability to run the engine as a open 
system. 
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Appendix A - Listing of Steg_nLSB.m 
% steg_nlsb.m 
% Used to n-LSB poison image files. 
% RemoveLSB function from Fabien A. P. Petitcolas 
% (http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/steganography /image_downgrading/ code.html) 
% Chris Pi Ison 
% 22 March, 2005 
% MS Thesis, Iowa State University 
~o///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
global ENDNUMBER; 
global IMAGEDIRECTORY; 
global OUTPUTDIRECTORY; 
global Data_to_embed; 
global CHANCE_ TO_INFECT; 
global LSB; 
ENDNUMBER = 747; 
LSB=3; 
% Number of images to process. 
% Image Directory. 
% Output Directory. 
% An image that will be used as hidden data. 
% How many LSB's to replace? 
IMAGEDIRECTORY = '320x240_greyscale_75pct_without_optimal_huffman_codes'; 
OUTPUTDIRECTORY = [IMAGEDIRECTORY,'_Kurak-',int2str(LSB),'LSB']; 
if (exist(OUTPUTDIRECTORY)-=7) % If OUTPUTDIRECTORY doesn't exist ... 
mkdir(OUTPUTDIRECTORY); 
end 
Data_to_embed = imread('hidden.jpg', 'jpeg'); 
CHANCE_ TO_INFECT = 0.33; 
% We'll create it. 
lnfectedFiles= []; 
time=[]; 
% Keep track of infected files. 
WaitMessage= ['Please wait, ',int2str(LSB),'-LSB infecting files... (chance to infect: 
',int2str(CHANCE_ TO_INFECT*l 00),'%)']; 
h = waitbar(O,WaitMessage); 
for i= 1 :ENDNUMBER 
% Show progressbar. 
tic; % Start the stopwatch. 
%if(abs(rand) >CHANCE_ TO_INFECT) % Percent chance to infect. 
% Damn. Rand doesn't seem to be constrained.:( 
if(bitand 
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((abs(rand)>CHANCE_ TO_INFEcn,(length(lnfectedFiles)<(CHANCE_ TO_INFECT*ENDNUMBER))) 
) 
lnfectFile=round(abs(rand*ENDNUMBER)); % Randomly select a file over [O,ENDNUMBER] 
if(lnfectFile==O) 
lnfectFile= 1; 
end 
% Make sure we didn't select zero. 
if(isempty(intersect(lnfectedFiles,lnfectFile)))% Is this a new infection? 
FileToBeRead=[IMAGEDIRECTORY,'\',int2str(lnfectFile),'.jpg'];% Suck in a file. 
STEGnLSB_lmage=imread(FileToBeRead); % Imports the image, equal to "i.JPG". 
Infected = uint8(double(RemoveLSB(STEGnLSB_lmage, LSB)) + double(Data_to_embed) 
I 2"(8-LSB)); 
% Output an infected file. 
FileToBeWritten=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\',int2str(lnfectFile),'.jpg']; 
lnfectedFiles= [Infected Files, lnfectFile]; 
i mwrite(I nf ected, Fi le ToBeWritten); % Write out the infected file. 
end 
end 
waitbar(i/ENDNUMBER); 
time = [time,toc]; % How many seconds did this pass take (vector)? 
end 
close(h); % Close the waitbar handler (window). 
% Write out CSV Files 
OutFileName= [OUTPUTDIRECTORY, '\infected .csv']; 
ColumnNames=['FILE,',int2str(LSB),'LSB_INFECTED']; 
dlmwrite(OutFileName, ColumnNames, "); 
out of this showing infected files. 
csvwrite(OutFileName,rot90(1nfectedFiles), 1 ,O); 
% Now do some time reporting ... 
% Write a header file for the CSV that' II come 
TimeDataName=['Steg_nLSB_',OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'_runtimes.csv']; 
ColumnNames=['Min,Mean,Max,StDev']; 
dlmwrite(TimeDataName, ColumnNames, "); 
ColumnValues=[min(time);mean(time);max(time);std(time)]; 
dlmwrite(TimeDataName, rot90(ColumnValues), '-append', 'newline', 'pc'); 
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Appendix B - Listing of Steghide.m 
% Steghide.m 
% Used to steghide-poison image files. 
% 
% Chris Pilson 
% 22 March, 2005 
% MS Thesis, Iowa State University 
rollll//llll//llllll//llllllllllllllllllllllll!/lllllllllllllllllllllllllll/lll 
global ENDNUMBER; 
global IMAGEDIRECTORY; 
global OUTPUTDIRECTORY; 
global Data_to_embed; 
global CHANCE_ TO_INFECT; 
global LSB; 
ENDNUMBER = 747; 
% Number of images to process. 
% Image Directory. 
% Output Directory. 
% A file that will be used as hidden data. 
% How many LSB's to replace? Changed@ runtime. 
STEGHIDECOMMAND = 'tools\steghide\steghide.exe'; 
IMAGEDIRECTORY = '640x480_greyscale_75pct_without_optimal_huffman_codes'; 
OUTPUTDIRECTORY = ['Steghide','.',IMAGEDIRECTORY]; 
if (exist(OUTPUTDIRECTORY)-=7) % If OUTPUTDIRECTORY doesn't exist ... 
mkdir(OUTPUTDIRECTORY); 
end 
Data_to_embed = 'PilsonlitReview.txt'; 
CHANCE_TO_INFECT = 0.33; 
Batchfile= []; 
lnfectedFiles=O; 
time=[]; 
% Create a batch file to run. 
% Keep track of infected files. 
WaitMessage=['Please wait, StegHide infecting files ... 
',int2str(CHANCE_ TO_INFECT*l 00),'%)']; 
h = waitbar(O,WaitMessage); 
for i= l :ENDNUMBER 
% Show progressbar. 
tic; % Start the stopwatch. 
(chance to 
%if(abs(rand) >CHANCE_ TO_INFECT) % Percent chance to infect. 
% Damn. Rand doesn't seem to be constrained.:( 
if(bitand 
infect: 
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((abs(rand)>CHANCE_ TO_INFECD,(length(lnfectedFiles)<(CHANCE_ TO_INFECT*ENDNUMBER))) 
) 
Inf ectFi le= round(abs(rand*EN DN UM BER)); % Randomly select a file over [O,ENDNUMBER] 
if(lnfectFile= =0) 
lnfectFile= l ; 
end 
% Make sure we didn't select zero. 
if(isempty(intersect(lnfectedFiles,lnfectFile)))% Is this a new infection? 
FileToBeRead=[IMAGEDIRECTORY,'\ ',int2str(lnfectFile),'.jpg'];% Suck in a file. 
%Steghide_Image=imread(FileToBeRead); % Imports the image, equal to "i.JPG". 
BatchfileLine=[STEGHIDECOMMAND,' embed -cf "',FileToBeRead,'" -ef 
',Data_to_embed,' -sf '",OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\',int2str(lnfectFile),'.jpg'",' -p "'"]; 
[status, result] = system(BatchfileLine); % Execute steghide on the chosen file. 
if (status == 0) % Fail silently; do nothing if status != 0. 
lnfectedFiles=[lnfectedFiles, lnfectFile]; % Go ahead and mark this as a "successful" 
infection. 
end 
end 
end 
waitbar(i/ENDNUMBER); 
time = [time.toe]; % How many seconds did this pass take (vector)? 
end 
close(h); % Close the waitbar handler (window). 
% Write out CSV Files 
OutFileName=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\infected.csv']; 
ColumnNames=['FILE,StegHide_INFECTED']; 
dlmwrite(OutFileName, ColumnNames, "); 
come out of this showing infected files. 
csvwrite(OutFileName,rot90(1nfectedFiles), l ,O); 
% Write a header file for the CSV that'll 
TimeDataName=['Steghide_',OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'_runtimes.csv']; 
ColumnNames=['Min,Mean,Max,StDev']; 
dlmwrite(TimeDataName, ColumnNames, "); 
ColumnValues=[min(time);mean(time);max(time);std(time)]; 
dlmwrite(TimeDataName, rot90(ColumnValues), '-append', 'newline', 'pc'); 
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Appendix C - Listing of ANNPreprocess.m 
% ANNPreprocess.m 
% Used to preprocess JPEG images for running through an ANN. 
% Chris Pilson 
% 22 March, 2005 
% MS Thesis, Iowa State University 
% 
~oll/////////////////ll/l/l/ll///ll/////////////ll/l/////////ll/////ll/l////I// 
global ENDNUMBER; % Number of images to process. 
global IMAGEDIRECTORY; % Image Directory. 
global OUTPUTDIRECTORY; % Where to dump resultsets. 
Copyl stOrderCommand = ['copy hist_headers.txt+']; 
Copy2ndOrderCommand = ['copy'); 
ENDNUMBER = 747; 
if (exist(OUTPUTDIRECTORY)==7) 
prior run? 
IMAGEDIRECTORY = OUTPUTDIRECTORY; 
directory for this run. 
end 
% Does the OUTPUTDIRECTORY exist from a 
% If so, then we'll use it as the INPUT 
OUTPUTDIRECTORY=[IMAGEDIRECTORY,'.','ANN_out']; % Set the new OUTPUT directory. 
if (exist(OUTPUTDIRECTORY)-=7) % If the new OUTPUTDIRECTORY doesn't exist ... 
mkdir(OUTPUTDIRECTORY); 
end 
dlmfile=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\hist_headers.txt']; 
% We'll create it. 
dlmwrite(dlmfile, 'HistMAX,HistMIN,HistSTDEV,HistVARIANCE,HistCLASS,HistBugFixForWEKA', 
"); 
dlmfile=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\bitplane_headers.txt1; 
dlmwrite(dlmfile, 'Entropy,Mean,StDev,VMax,VMin,VMean,StDev2,CLASS,BugFixForWEKA', "); 
Inf ectedCSVFi le = [I MAG EDI RECTORY,'\ infected. csv']; 
lnfectedFiles = csvread(lnfectedCSVFile); 
lnfectedFiles = sort(lnfectedFiles); 
bitplane_stats = []; 
histogram_stats= [); 
time=[]; 
WaitMessage=['Please wait, Processing Images for ANN... (target directory: 
',OUTPUTDIRECTORY,')']; 
h = waitbar(O,WaitMessage); 
for i= l :ENDNUMBER 
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% Show progressbar. 
tic; % Start the stopwatch. 
if (ismember(i,lnfectedFiles)) 
CLASS=l; 
else 
CLASS=O; 
% Is the current image a member of the infected files? 
% If yes, we'll classify it as"+", for "infected". 
% Otherwise, not infected. 
end 
FileToBeRead=[IMAGEDIRECTORY,'\',int2str(i),'.jpg']; 
CPlmage_gray=imread(FileToBeRead); % Imports the image, equal to "i.JPG". 
% ////////////////FIRST-ORDER STATISTICS//// II II////// I I 
% Getting the BITPLANE: 
CPlmage_double = double(CPlmage_gray); % Make a DOUBLE representation of 
CPimage_gray 
SaveToBitplane=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\bitplane_',int2str(i),'.txt']; % Build the filename to save 
under. 
CPlmage_diff = diff(CPlmage_gray); % Get n-1 differences within CPimage_gray. 
SaveBitplaneDiffs=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\bitplane_diff_',int2str(i),'.txt']; 
%csvwrite(SaveBitplaneDiffs,CPimage_diff); 
CPlmage_entropy = entropy(CPlmage_gray); 
CPlmage_double_mean = mean2(CPlmage_double); % Get max, min, mean values (nnn2 for 
matrix). 
CPlmage_double_stdev = std2(CPlmage_double); % Get Standard Deviation for image 
COLUMNS (stdev2 for matrix). 
CPlmage_double_vmax = var(max(CPlmage_double)); '7'o Variance of max values in columns. 
CPlmage_double_vmin = var(min(CPlmage_double)); % Variance of min values in columns. 
CPlmage_double_vmean = var(mean(CPlmage_double)); 
CPlmage_double_vstdev = var(std(CPlmage_double)); 
CPlmage_double_stats=[CPlmage_entropy,CPlmage_double_mean,CPlmage_double_stdev,CPI 
mage_double_ vmax,CPlmage_double_ vmin ,CPI mage_dou ble_ vmean ,CPI mage_dou ble_ vstdev, 
CLASS,O]; 
bitplane_stats = [bitp lane_stats ;CPI mag e_dou ble_stats]; 
% Working with the HISTOGRAM: 
CPlmage_imhist = imhist(CPlmage_gray); % Stores the histogram to CPimage_imhist. Y 
variable is the vector position [0,255] 
Savelmhist=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\Histogram_',int2str(i),'.txt'); 
CPlmage_imhist_diff = diff(CPlmage_imhist); '7'o Get n-1 differences within CPimage_imhist. 
SavelmhistDiff=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\Histogram_diff_',int2str(i),'.txt']; 
75 
CPlmage_imhist_max = max(CPlmage_imhist); 
CPlmage_imhist_min = min(CPlmage_imhist); 
CPlmage_imhist_stdev = std(CPlmage_imhist); % Get Standard Deviation for histogram. 
CPlmage_imhist_var = var(double(CPlmage_imhist)); % Get variability of image histogram. 
Store as string. 
CPlmage_imhist_dstats=[CPlmage_imhist_max,CPlmage_imhist_min,CPlmage_imhist_stdev,CP 
lmage_imhist_var,CLASS,O]; 
histogram_stats=[histogram_stats;CPlmage_imhist_dstats]; 
SavelmhistDStats=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\Histogram_dstsats_',int2str(i),'.txt']; 
waitbar(i/ENDNUMBER); 
time = [time,toc]; 
end 
% How many seconds did this pass take (vector)? 
outfile=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\',IMAGEDIRECTORY,'.bitplane_stats.csv']; 
csvwrite(outfi le, bitplane_stats); 
outfile=[OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'\',IMAGEDIRECTORY,'.histogram_stats.csv']; 
csvwrite( outfi I e, hi stog ra m_s tats); 
close(h); % Kill off the waitbar handle. 
% Now do some time reporting ... 
TimeDataName=['ANNPreProcess_',OUTPUTDIRECTORY,'_runtimes.csv']; 
ColumnNames=['Min,Mean,Max,StDev']; 
dlmwrite(TimeDataName, ColumnNames, "); 
ColumnValues=[min(time);mean(time);max(time);std(time)]; 
dlmwrite(TimeDataName, rot90(ColumnValues), '-append', 'newline', 'pc'); 
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Appendix F - Insertion Runtime vs. Type of Image 
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Appendix I - Grayscale Photo Plates for Images Utilized 
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